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SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD IN CALIFORNIA:
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Surrogate motherhood is becoming an increasingly popular alter-
native for women unable to bear children. Nevertheless, certain
California statutes not intended to deal with surrogate mother-
hood serve as potential barriers to the practice. This Comment
examines the statutory obstacles created by the California Codes.
The author recommends specific legislative amendments to the
California Civil and Evidence Codes in order to facilitate the
practice of surrogate motherhood but concludes that the Penal
Code sections prohibiting payment for the transfer of custody and
adoption should not be modified.
Recent newspaper articles,' magazine features, 2 and law review
comments 3 attest to increasing interest in surrogate motherhood
as an alternative for women unable to bear children. When a
married couple's inability to have a child results from the wife's
infertility, another woman may be artificially inseminated with
the semen of the fertile husband. The resulting child, the biologi-
cal product of the husband, is turned over at birth to the couple.
In recent years, surrogate motherhood has become increasingly
attractive because of two advantages over routine adoption:
speed and the biological nexus. As expanded birth control meth-
1. E.g., Beyette, Having a Child by a Surrogate Parent, LA. Times, Aug. 22,
1980, § V, at 1, col. 1; Castillo, When Women Bear Children for Others, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 22, 1980, § B, at 6, col. 2; Krier, Surrogate Motherhood:- Looking at It as Busi-
ness Proposition, L.A Times, Mar. 30, 1981, § V, at 1, coL 3; Marcus, The Baby
Maker, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 1; Quindlen, Surrogate Mothers: A Contro-
versial Solution to Infertility, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1980, § B, at 12, coL 1; Thistle,
Surrogate Motherhood. Can the Many Perplexing Moral, Legal Issues Be Re-
solved?, San Diego Union, Mar. 8, 1981, § C, at 1, col. 1; Truman, "Babymaker" Will
Deliver Finished Product to Couple, Daily Californian (El Cajon, Cal.), Sept 30,
1980, § B, at 1, col 1.
2. E.g., White, Motherhood the "Surrogate" Way, SCL DIG., Mar. 1980, at 25;
MACLEAN'S, Mar. 10, 1980, at 10; PEoPLE, Dec. 8, 1980, at 52; PEOPLE, Apr. 21, 1980, at
3. See, e.g., Kinney, Legal Issues of the New Reproductive Technologies, 52
CAL. ST. B.J. 514 (1977); Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 611
(1978).
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ods and liberalized abortion laws have checked the pace of pro-
creation, and as single mothers have become more inclined to
keep their babies, prospective adoptive couples face a shortage of
adoptive children and a wait of up to seven years.4 The use of a
surrogate mother can shorten this waiting period to less than a
year. Furthermore, because adoptive children are in demand, the
adopting couple may not have a choice of age, race, or other phys-
ical characteristics. A child conceived with the aid of a surrogate,
on the other hand, is the biological child of the husband.
Until 1981, no completed surrogate arrangements were known to
exist in California. Several children had been born as a result of
surrogate motherhood in other jurisdictions, however,5 and Cali-
fornia couples had expressed interest and sought legal assistance
in establishing similar agreements. 6 The early part of 1981 saw a
sudden increase in surrogate motherhood in California. The par-
ticipation of California citizens in surrogate arrangements and
completed births, and the breach of a surrogate agreement by a
California woman in early 1981,7 have underscored the need for
legislative changes to deal with this growing practice. Recent leg-
islation amending the conclusive presumption of paternity has
eliminated a major legal obstacle to surrogate motherhood in Cal-
ifornia.8 Nevertheless, a number of statutory impediments re-
main which create uncertainty and risk for the semen donor and
4. Interview of Dr. Richard M. Levin on The Phil Donahue Show, Donahue
Transcript No. 04150 (Apr. 15, 1980) at 20; Castillo, When Women Bear Children for
Others, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1980, § B, at 6, col. 2 (interview of California attorney
William Handel).
5. As of March 1981, Michigan attorney Noel P. Keane reported ten births.
Thistle, Surrogate Motherhood: Can the Many Perplexing Mora Legal Issues Be
Resolved?, San Diego Union, Mar. 8, 1981, § C, at 1, col 1. The first reported surro-
gate birth in Kentucky, arranged by Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., of Louis-
ville, occurred Nov. 9, 1980. PEOPLE, Dec. 8, 1980, at 52; Daily Californian (El Cajon,
CaL), Nov. 15, 1980, § A, at 2, coL 2.
6. See Beyette, Having a Child by a Surrogate Parent, LA Times, Aug. 22,
1980, § V, at 1, col. 1; White, Motherhood the "Surrogate" Way, SCL DIG., Mar. 1980,
at 25. A Sacramento attorney reported a client seeking a surrogate mother in 1980.
Marcus, The Baby Maker, Natl LJ., Aug. 25, 1980, at 1, coL 1. In the fall of 1980 Mr.
Keane found a Michigan woman willing to be a surrogate for a single California
man. Daily Californian (El Cajon, Cal.), Oct. 15, 1980, § A, at 2, coL 1.
7. In January 1981 Los Angeles attorney William Handel arranged the insemi-
nation of a surrogate mother. Telephone interview with William Handel (Jan. 15,
1981). In the same month, another surrogate in Los Angeles was reportedly await-
ing the birth of a donor's child. Daily Californian (El Cajon, Cal.), Jan. 16, 1981,
§ A, at 6, coL 1. In February 1981 a California couple brought home the baby borne
for them by a Texas surrogate. Thistle, Surrogate Motherhood- Can the Many Per-
plexing Moral, Legal Issues Be Resolved?, San Diego Union, Mar. 8, 1981, § C, at 1,
col. 1. A month later, a California surrogate about to deliver a baby for a New
York couple changed her mind and notified the couple that she intended to keep
the child. San Diego Union, Mar. 22, 1981, § A, at 3, coL 5.
8. CAL. EVD. CODE § 621 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981).
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his wife. This Comment will analyze those remaining barriers
and will suggest the extent to which California should further
modify its legislation to allow for this childbearing option.9
CURRENT PROCEDURES
Surrogate motherhood arrangements in Michigan and Ken-
tucky, which have received recent publicity, provide a background
against which the situation in California can be examined. 0 A
favorable pattern of paternity and adoption laws has enabled at-
torneys in Michigan to establish a legal procedure for effecting
surrogate motherhood." The surrogate is inseminated by a phy-
sician with semen of the husband of the adoptive couple.12 After
conception, but prior to birth, the donor-husband files a notice of
intent to claim paternity with the county court.13 The court trans-
mits the notice to the vital records division of the department of
health, which forwards a copy of the notice to the surrogate
mother. If the surrogate does not deny the claim, the donor is
9. This Comment will not consider the arguments for and against surrogate
motherhood in general. At one time courts expressed their distaste for artificial
insemination whether by donor or by husband, but more recent decisions have ac-
knowledged its social acceptance by holding that the resulting child is as legiti-
mate as the one produced by sexual intercourse. E.g. People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal.
2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc.
2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1973). Similarly, moral uncertainty as to surrogate mother-
hood is giving way to an understanding of the process as a valid childbearing op-
tion. This Comment will also not discuss in depth, situations in which single
women, single men, or fertile women seek surrogates to bear children for them.
The Comment's scope is limited to cases involving married couples unable to have
children because of the wife's inability to carry a child. But see text accompanying
notes 206-09 infra.
10. For agreements handled by Michigan attorney Noel P. Keane, see Marcus,
The Baby Maker, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 25, 1980, at 1, coL 1; White, Motherhood the "Surro-
gate" Way, SCL DIG., Mar. 1980, at 25; Daily Californian (El Cajon, Cal.), Nov. 15,
1980, § A, at 2, col. 2; MACLEAN'S, Mar. 10, 1980, at 10; Interview of Noel P. Keane on
The Phil Donahue Show, Donahue Transcript No. 07290 (July 29, 1980). For those
agreements arranged by Surrogate Parenting Associates of Louisville, Kentucky,
see Beyette, Having a Child by a Surrogate Parent, LA. Times, Aug. 22, 1980, § V,
at 1, col. 1; Truman, "Babymaker" Will Deliver Finished Product to Couple, Daily
Californian (El Cajon, Cal.), Sept. 30, 1980, § B, at 1, coL 1; PEoPLE, Dec. 8, 1980, at
52; PEOPLE, Apr. 21, 1980, at 38; Interview of Dr. Richard M. Levin and attorney Ka-
tie Brophy on The Phil Donahue Show, Donahue Transcript No. 04150 (Apr. 15,
1980).
11. Telephone interview with Noel P. Keane (Aug. 13, 1980).
12. MAcLEAN's, Mar. 10, 1980, at 10.
13. MicH. Comp. LAwsANN. § 710.33 (West Supp. 1980).
presumed to be the father of the unborn child.14 At the time of
birth, the donor executes an acknowledgement of paternity, and
his name is entered on the birth certificate as the natural and le-
gal father of the child. The name of the surrogate mother is en-
tered as the natural and legal mother.15 When the surrogate
relinquishes her rights to custody of the child, the court grants
custody to the donor-father.16
The second step in this process requires the donor's wife to pe-
tition for adoption of the child under Michigan law, which permits
private as well as agency adoptions.1 7 Although the Michigan
statute provides for a one-year waiting period after entry of the
order terminating parental rights, the court may waive the one-
year period, or any portion thereof, in the best interests of the
adoptee.18
Attorneys and physicians in Kentucky have used a similar pro-
cedure.19 Kentucky law permits the voluntary termination of pa-
rental rights five days after birtho and the administration of
blood tests to ensure that the donor is actually the father of the
child.21 In a petition to relinquish her parental rights, the surro-
14. Id. The marital status of the surrogate has no bearing on the donor's right
to claim paternity under this section. The presumption is rebuttable.
15. Telephone interview with Noel P. Keane (Aug. 13, 1980).
16. MicH. CoMp. LAWs ANN. § 710.39(3) (West Supp. 1980).
17. Id. § 710.24.
18. Id. § 710.56.
19. Dr. Richard M. Levin and attorney Katie Brophy of Surrogate Parenting
Associates, Inc., of Louisville, Kentucky, have used this type of procedure. They
report from 500 to 1000 applicants and predict 100 deliveries by November 1981.
Beyette, Having a Child by a Surrogate Parent, L.A. Times, Aug. 22, 1980, § V, at 1,
col. 1; Truman, "Babymaker" Will Deliver Finished Product to Couple, Daily Cali-
fornian (El Cajon, Cal.), Sept. 30, § B, at 1, col 1.
The Attorney General of Kentucky has filed suit against Surrogate Parenting
Associates, Inc., for a declaratory judgment that such contracts violate state laws
as well as public policy. Kentucky v. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc., No. 81-CI-
0121 (Franklin Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 27, 1981). The state argues not only that payment
to the surrogate is illegal and against public policy, see note 195 infra, but also that
any contract in which a mother agrees before birth to surrender her parental
rights violates the Kentucky statutes requiring a pre-adoption waiting period of
five days after birth. Ky. REV. STAT. 199.500(5) (1978). Id. § 208C.050(2) (1980) (re-
placing § 199.601(2) (1978) which is still referred to by the Kentucky Attorney Gen-
eral). See Kentucky v. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc., No. 81-CI-0121, Exhibit D,
(Franklin Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 27, 1981) (Letter from Attorney General Steven L. Bes-
hear to Mr. Joe Ward (Jan. 26, 1981)); Thistle, Surrogate Motherhood. Can the
Many Perplexing Mora Legal Issues Be Resolved?, San Diego Union, Mar. 8, 1981,
§ C, at 1, coL 1.
20. Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.500(5) (1978). Id § 208C.050 (1980) (replacing id.
§ 199.601 (1978) which is still referred to by the Kentucky Attorney General).
21. Id. §§ 406.081, .091, .II (1979). Surrogate Parenting Associates in Louisville
requires the surrogate, the donor, the child, and the surrogate's husband to un-
dergo blood and tissue typing (HLA) tests to confirm the donor's paternity. Be-
cause the IILA tests must be performed on the child, the paternity of the donor
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gate names the donor as the person to'whom parental rights are
to be transferred 22 and gives her reasons for desiring the termina-
tion.2 Kentucky statutes also establish various ways in which a
putative father may acknowledge his paternity and thereby be
made a party to an action for termination of parental rights.24 As
in Mlichigan, once the surrogate has terminated her parental
rights and surrendered custody to the donor-father, the donor's
wife can adopt the child from the surrogate. 25 The department for
human resources issues a new birth certificate after entry of the
adoption judgment.26
Although California's adoption laws permit the donor's wife to
adopt the child, the state's paternity and artificial insemination
statutes make it difficult for the donor to prove he is the father of
the child. Like most states, California permits a parent to place a
child for adoption.27 Thus, the surrogate, as the natural mother of
the child, can place the child for adoption with the donor's wife.
A statutory provision for adoption by a stepparent (the donor's
wife) where one natural parent (the donor) retains custody and
control of the child also facilitates the adoption transaction.28 In
California, as well as in Mlichigan and Kentucky, once the donor is
declared the natural and legal father of the child, his wife can pe-
cannot be established until after delivery. Interview with Dr. Richard M. Levin on
The Phil Donahue Show, Donahue Transcript No. 04150 (Apr. 15, 1980) at 12.
22. Ky. REV. STAT. § 208C.050(4) (e) (1980).
23. Id. § 208C.050 (4) (d).
24. If the'donor has voluntarily identified the mother by affidavit, acknowl-
edged the child within sixty days of birth, caused his name to be affixed to the
birth certificate of the child, commenced a judicial proceeding claiming parental
rights, contributed financially to the birth or support of the child, or married the
child's mother, or if he is openly living with her or the child, he will be made a
party to the surrogate's action to terminate her parental rights. Id.
§ 208C.040(1) (a)-(f) (1980). The purpose of these statutes is not to enable a donor
to establish his paternity, but to enable a mother to bring a paternity action
against a putative father. Nevertheless, the legislation provides several methods
by which a donor can establish his paternity.
25. Id. § 199.470 (1980). Subsection 199.470 (4) (a) provides that when a child is
sought to be adopted by a stepparent he need not be placed for adoption by a li-
censed institution. Nor is permission of the secretary of human resources re-
quired.
26. Id. § 199.570 (1980).
27. "Any person other than a parent or any organization, association, or corpo-
ration that, without holding a valid and unrevoked license or permit to place chil-
dren for adoption issued by the State Department of Social Services, places any
child for adoption is guilty of a misdemeanor." CAT. CIV. CODE § 224q (West Supp.
1980).
28. Id. § 226.9 (West Supp. 1980).
tition to adopt the child from the surrogate, who will already have
relinquished her parental rights. The new birth certificate issued
after the adoption will name the donor and his wife as the child's
parents.29
This procedure requires that the law recognize the donor as the
father of the child. Were he not the child's father, he would have
to petition to adopt the child as a non-relative and would have to
file with the court a full accounting of all disbursements made in
connection with the birth of the child.30 More importantly, were
the surrogate to attempt to keep the child after birth, a man not
considered the legal father of the child would have no standing to
claim custody.31 A donor not legally recognized as the child's fa-
ther thus runs the risk of losing the child who is biologically his
own, despite his acknowledged intention to the contrary.32
In Michigan, the donor can file a notice of intent to claim pater-
nity even before the birth of the child.33 In Kentucky, he can es-
tablish his paternity under one of the statutorily specified
29. CAL. Civ. CODE § 7010(b) (West Supp. 1980); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 10450 (West Supp. 1980).
30. The petitioners in any proceeding seeking the adoption of a minor
child shall file with the court a full accounting report of all disbursements
of anything of value made or agreed to be made by them or on their behalf
in connection with the birth of the child, the placement of the child with
the petitioners, any medical or hospital care received by the natural
mother of the child or by the child in connection with its birth, any other
expenses of either natural parent of the child, or the adoption. ..
The provisions of this section shall not apply to an adoption by a step-
parent where one natural or adoptive parent retains his or her custody
and control of the child.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 224r (West Supp. 1980). See text accompanying notes 147-54 in-
fra.
31. The possible remedies in case of breach of agreement by either the surro-
gate or the adoptive couple are beyond the scope of this Comment. Breach is al-
ways a risk, however, and has already occurred in at least one case involving a
California surrogate who announced her intention to keep the child. San Diego
Union, Mar. 22, 1981, § A, at 3, col 5. The possibility of breach must be considered
when analyzing the need for legislation and when drafting a contract between an
adoptive couple and a prospective surrogate mother. See note 183 infra.
32. Theoretically the transaction could be handled as an independent adop-
tion, for which the donor need not establish his paternity. The surrogate and her
husband, who is the presumed natural father, would relinquish their parental
rights to the adoptive couple, the semen donor and his wife. To rely on the adop-
tion procedure alone, however, assumes the cooperation of all parties throughout
the pregnancy, birth, and adoption. Prospective parents involved in a routine
adoption realize that the natural mother may decide during her pregnancy to keep
her child. Since they have no biological connection with the child and will have
lost only the waiting period, they may be willing to take that chance. The semen
donor involved in surrogate motherhood, however, is the biological father of the
surrogate's child and hence less willing to risk losing that child. Recognizing him
as the child's legal father gives him an opportunity to challenge the surrogate who
attempts to keep the child.
33. MicH. CoM. LAws ANN. § 710.33 (West Supp. 1980). See text accompany-
ing note 117 infra.
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methods.34 California laws, however, not only fail to provide a
means by which the donor can acknowledge his paternity, but ef-
fectively preclude him from doing so, thus creating legal obstacles
to surrogate motherhood itself. The remainder of this Comment
analyzes those obstacles: the conclusive presumption of pater-
nity, the rebuttable presumptions of paternity, the lack of a suita-
ble method for the donor to establish his own paternity, and the
artificial insemination statute. The final sections examine Califor-
nia's prohibition of payment for the transfer of custody or adop-
tion and the extent to which the legislature should modify the law
to facilitate surrogate motherhood in California.
TE CONcLusIvE PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY
Both the Evidence Code and the Civil Code of California con-
tain presumptions of paternity.35 Until September 30, 1980, Evi-
dence Code section 621 established a conclusive presumption that
a married woman's husband was the father of her child.36 That
law presented a major obstacle to surrogate motherhood in Cali-
fornia. Although the conclusive presumption would not present
an obstacle if the surrogate were single,37 physicians and attor-
neys have preferred to use married surrogates who have already
borne children. Presumably, these women have proven them-
selves physically capable of conception and childbearing and are
less likely to keep the child than are single women without chil-
dren.38 Nevertheless, until the 1980 amendment the conclusive
presumption of paternity effectively barred the use of married wo-
men as surrogates.
Prior to 1980, the conclusive presumption of paternity could be
avoided only if the husband were impotent or sterile.39 The 1980
34. Ky. REV. STAT. § 208C.040 (1980). See text accompanying note 24 supra.
35. CAL. CrV. CODE § 7004 (West Supp. 1980); CAT. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1966
& Supp. 1981) [hereinafter referred to in text as section 621].
36. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the issue of a wife cohabiting
with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a
child of the marriage." CAT. EvID. CODE § 621 (West 1966 & Supp. 1980). See note
41 infra.
37. See text accompanying notes 53-57 infra.
38. Quindlen, Surrogate Mothers: A Controversial Solution to Infertility, N.Y.
Times, May 27, 1980, § B, at 12, col 1; Interview of Dr. Richard M. Levin on The Phil
Donahue Show, Donahue Transcript No. 04150 (Apr. 15, 1980) at 3-4.
39. CAT. Evm. CODE § 621 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981).
legislation provided a third exception.40 If blood test evidence ex-
cludes the surrogate's husband as a possible father of the child,
the presumption is rebutted and the question of paternity is re-
solved accordingly.41
By admitting blood test results to rebut the presumption of pa-
ternity, the amended statute eliminates a significant barrier to
surrogate motherhood and cures one constitutional flaw of the
previously conclusive presumption. Prior to the 1980 amendment,
even if the surrogate and her husband agreed that the donor was
the natural father of the child, the law precluded the surrogate's
husband from denying his own paternity. Under the amended
statute, if the surrogate's husband supports his wife's agreement
to relinquish parental rights, he may rebut the presumption of his
paternity. The parties may then bring an action to establish the
paternity of the donor under the appropriate provisions of the
California Civil Code.42 The amended statute also meets the re-
quirements of procedural due process as applied to the surro-
gate's husband.43 Until 1980, California's conclusive presumption
of paternity denied the husband an opportunity to rebut the pre-
sumption that he was the father of his wife's child. As amended,
the statute now permits him to rebut the presumption with appro-
priate blood test evidence.
Even as amended, however, section 621 still prevents the donor
40. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the issue of a wife cohab-
iting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively pre-
sumed to be a child of the marriage.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a), if the court
finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence
based upon blood tests performed pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing
with Section 890) of Division 7 are that the husband is not the father of
the child, the question of paternity of the husband shall be resolved ac-
cordingly.
The notice of motion for blood tests under this subdivision shall only be
raised by the husband and shall be raised not later than two years from
the date of birth of the child.
The notice of motion for the blood tests pursuant to this subdivision
must be supported by a declaration under oath submitted by the moving
party stating the factual basis for placing the issue of paternity before the
court. This requirement shall not apply to any case pending before the
court on the effective date of the amendment to this section adopted at the
1979-80 Regular Session of the Legislature.
The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply to any case which has
reached final judgment of paternity on the effective date of the amend-
ment to this section adopted at the 1979-80 Regular Session of the Legisla-
ture.
Id. § 621 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981). The amending act was an urgency statute
which went into immediate effect on Sept. 30, 1980.
41. Id.
42. CAr. Crv. CoDE §§ 7004, 7006 (West Supp. 1980). See text accompanying
notes 85-124 infra.
43. See text accompanying notes 46-48 infra.
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from establishing his paternity in certain cases. Only the surro-
gate's husband may raise the notice of motion for blood tests.44
Where the surrogate and her husband decide to keep the child,
the donor cannot introduce blood test evidence himself. In such a
circumstance, the donor is afforded no more protection than he
was prior to the 1980 amendment.45
Furthermore, as applied to surrogate motherhood the statute
arguably is unconstitutional on procedural due process grounds,
under an irrebuttable presumption analysis, and as a denial of
equal protection of the law. The presumption remains unconsti-
tutional on procedural due process grounds because it denies the
semen donor an opportunity to rebut it. The requirements of pro-
cedural due process apply to deprivations of liberty or property
interests protected by the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution.46 The United States Supreme Court has held
that those fundamental, constitutionally protected interests in-
clude the individual's right to decide whether to procreate and
rear children.47 Since such fundamental interests are at stake in
surrogate motherhood, procedural due process requires that the
donor be given an opportunity to be heard. 8 Without such an op-
portunity, he is unable to rebut the presumption of the husband's
paternity and therefore is unable to establish his own. By deny-
ing the donor the right to prove his paternity, the statute impairs
44. CAT. EvIn. CODE § 621 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981).
45. The parties may agree in their contract that the surrogate's husband will
raise the notice of motion for blood tests. (See text accompanying notes 197-205
infra for a discussion of other contract provisions.) A court will not necessarily
grant specific performance of this provision, however. See text accompanying note
177 infra.
46. "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law. . . .", U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
47. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
48. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). These cases focused on the type of
liberty or property interest whose deprivation would require the protection of pro-
cedural due process, and on the nature of the hearing required. Surrogate mother-
hood clearly affects the fundamental interests of the donor, as well as those of the
surrogate's husband, now protected by the amended statute. The nature of the
hearing which would be required to protect the donor's rights goes beyond the
question of the constitutionality of the application of the statute. At the least, the
donor must be afforded some opportunity to rebut the presumption of the surro-
gate's husband's paternity. Section 621 prevents him from doing so at any time
and thus leaves his fundamental interests unprotected.
his fundamental right to decide to have a child when his wife is
unable to bear children. The amended statute is also unconstitu-
tional as applied to the surrogate who wishes to surrender her pa-
rental rights but whose husband wants to keep the child and
refuses to order blood tests. Like the donor, she is denied the
right to rebut the presumption that her husband is the father of
the child.
Section 621, as applied to surrogate motherhood, also appears
unconstitutional under an irrebuttable presumption analysis. The
United States Supreme Court has held that where the state pur-
ports to be concerned with a particular status it may not deny one
seeking that status the opportunity to show factors that clearly
bear on the issue.49 In enacting a presumption of paternity the
state is avowedly concerned with the status of paternity, yet in
making that presumption conclusive it denies the semen donor an
opportunity to offer evidence of his paternity. Although the Court
has been reluctant to extend this analysis when the status is not
constitutionally protected, it has distinguished those cases deal-
ing with protected rights.50 Where fundamental interests are af-
fected, such an approach is still appropriate. For example, the
Court has held that an unwed father cannot be presumed to be
unfit to have custody of his child without an opportunity to prove
his fitness in a custody proceeding.5' The same fundamental
rights of childbearing and child rearing are affected in surrogate
motherhood as are affected in custody disputes. The donor
should not be presumed not to be the father of the surrogate's
child without an opportunity to prove his paternity.52
The conclusive presumption of paternity denies the married
surrogate the equal protection of the law because it does not also
restrict the decision-making rights of single women who wish to
serve as surrogates. The statute impairs a married woman's right
49. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (state residency for purpose of tui-
tion assessment).
50. Weinberger v. SalfI, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
51. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La-
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (presumption that every woman who is more than four
months pregnant cannot satisfactorily work violates due process). See also In re
Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975), citing Stanley and
discussed in note 93 infra. Stanley can also be examined in equal protection
terms. The state denied unwed fathers a hearing on parental fitness while grant-
ing such a hearing to all other parents whose custody was challenged. Weinberger
v. Salfl, 422 U.S. at 771.
52. The court's concern over the difficulties of individual determinations,
Weinberger v. Sal, 422 U.S. at 777; United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413
U.S. 508, 518 (1973), can be met by the adoption of pretrial hearing procedures
which would reduce unnecessary litigation. See text accompanying notes 109-11
infra.
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both directly and indirectly. Directly, the law subjects her deci-
sion to her husband's veto, while imposing no equivalent restric-
tion on the decision of a single woman. If a married surrogate's
husband refuses to introduce blood test evidence, she cannot re-
but his paternity. His refusal to rebut the presumption of his own
paternity vetoes the married surrogate's decision to bear a child
for the donor and his wife.53 Indirectly, the presumption of pater-
nity encourages donors to use unmarried rather than married wo-
men and thereby limits the opportunities available to married
women who wish to serve as surrogates. To the extent that they
are passed over in favor of single women, they are indirectly re-
stricted in the exercise of their right to be surrogates. The donor
is similarly restricted. Although he may prefer to use a married
woman, the statute creates a risk not present were he to use a
single surrogate. Thus, the law deters the donor from using the
preferred procedure.54 The statute narrows the field of suitable
surrogates and indirectly impairs the donor's right to beget a
child through the use of a surrogate mother.
The effect of the presumption of paternity on surrogate mother-
hood is to classify surrogates on the basis of marital status.5 5 Al-
though a statute affecting surrogate motherhood might
legitimately classify surrogates as distinct from other childbear-
ing women, section 621 underinclusively classifies only married
surrogates, not all surrogates. The classification is over inclusive
as well because it includes married surrogates who intend to re-
linquish their children along with married women who intend to
bear children for their own family. The state has no legitimate in-
53. This veto power itself is inconsistent with the decision in Planned
Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), in which the United States
Supreme Court held that a husband does not have a veto power over his wife's
decision to have an abortion. Both the decision to have an abortion and the deci-
sion to serve as a surrogate are related to the fundamental right to decide whether
or not to bear a child, which was established in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
54. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
55. In some areas, the United States Supreme Court has required purposeful
discrimination before declaring a statute unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds. E.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977), Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (disproportionate impact alone is
not sufficient evidence of denial of equal protection on basis of race). Where a
fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution is involved,
however, discriminatory effect alone justifies a presumption of unconstitutionality.
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
terest in classifying surrogates according to their marital status or
in encouraging the use of single rather than married women as
surrogates, especially when those involved in the procedure favor
the use of married rather than single women.5 6 This classification
of married women who wish to be surrogates lacks a rational rela-
tion to a legitimate state interest and therefore denies those wo-
men the equal protection of the law. 7
A further amendment of section 621 permitting the donor and
the surrogate to rebut the presumption might make the statute
constitutional on both due process and equal protection grounds
as applied to surrogate motherhood. Such an amendment would
eliminate a significant statutory barrier to surrogate motherhood.
Because amendment would create yet another exception to a pur-
portedly conclusive presumption, however, the better approach is
to repeal the statute rather than continue the string of exceptions.
The section has no continuing justification. In cases of surrogate
motherhood, its original objectives do not apply; in traditional ac-
tions to determine paternity, its policies are met by the rebuttable
presumptions of the Civil Code.58
The conclusive presumption of paternity does bear a reasonable
relation to state interests in the integrity of the family, the protec-
tion of the child, and the financial concerns of the state.5 9 The
presumption has therefore traditionally excluded evidence tend-
ing to show non-spousal conception, lest such evidence impugn
family integrity.60 Another justification offered for the presump-
56. The state does have a legitimate interest in the presumption that the hus-
band of a married woman is the father of her child, see text accompanying notes
59-65 infra, but this interest can be protected by a rebuttable presumption of pa-
ternity. See text accompanying notes 81-84 infra.
57. It can be argued that a strict scrutiny standard should be applied, because
the right of procreation is among the rights of personal privacy protected by the
Constitution. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34
n.76 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Where fundamental rights
are asserted under the equal protection clause, classifications which might re-
strain them may be closely scrutinized. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 670 (1966). Thus a classification of surrogates according to their marital
status burdens a constitutionally protected right and can be justified only by a
compelling state interest. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). A statute
which burdens such a fundamental right, however, may be characterized more ac-
curately as a denial of due process than as a denial of equal protection. See Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659-62 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). If an equal
protection approach is used, as noted in the text, even a rational relation test ren-
ders the classification unconstitutional.
58. See CA. CiM. CODE § 7004 (West Supp. 1980). See note 81 infra for full
text.
59. Comment, California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy-Its Legal
Effect and Its Questionable Constitutionality, 35 S. CAr. L. REv. 437, 465-67 (1962).
60. Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 619, 354 P.2d 657, 668, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129, 140
(1960).
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tion has been the protection of the innocent child from the social
stigma of illegitimacy should his father disclaim paternity. At
common law, the illegitimate child was nullius filius and had
none of the legal rights of a child legitimately born.6 1 Further-
more, the state has a valid interest in enforcing parental obliga-
tions in order to avoid a public burden of financial support for the
abandoned child.
Valid though these concerns may have been at the time of en-
actment, and may still be today, they do not bear a rational rela-
tion to the presumption of paternity in the context of surrogate
motherhood. The problems the presumption attempts to avoid
are minimized when a father, other than the mother's husband,
seeks to accept his parental responsibilities. Rather than weaken
the family of the surrogate, 62 surrogate motherhood strengthens
the family of the adoptive couple 63 by providing them with a child
they otherwise might not have. Technically, the child is illegiti-
mate because his parents (the surrogate and the donor) are not
married to each other. Nevertheless, a child born through surro-
gate motherhood will have both a mother (the donor's wife) and a
father (the donor) and will thereby avoid the stigma of illegiti-
macy.64 The state need not fear that the child will become depen-
dent on public funds because once the donor establishes his
paternity he will be obligated to support the child.65
An additional justification for the conclusive presumption of pa-
ternity involved problems of proof. In the past, the difficulty of
61. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COvImENTARIEs *459.
62. The reaction of the surrogate's family varies even during the procedure.
The husband of Dr. Levin's pseudonymous surrogate, "Elizabeth Kane," was re-
luctant at first, but he now supports her decision. Her three children thought their
mother's contribution to an infertile couple's family was "fantastic" but admit they
were taunted by school friends. Interview with "Elizabeth Kane," The Phil Dona-
hue Show, Donahue Transcript No. 04150 (Apr. 15, 1980) at 9; PEOPLE, Dec. 8, 1980,
at 52.
63. Although only the wife actually adopts the child (the donor being the
child's biological father), "adoptive couple" is used herein to refer to the semen
donor and his wife together.
64. The Uniform Parentage Act eliminated the categorization of children as
"legitimate" or "illegitimate" in its attempt to ensure the same rights to all chil-
dren regardless of the marital status of their parents. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
§ 2, Commissioners' Comment, 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 579 (1979). In adopt-
ing the Uniform Parentage Act, the California legislature also amended Evidence
Code § 621 by substituting "presumed a child of the marriage" for "presumed legit-
imate." CAL. Evw. CODE § 621 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981).
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1980).
proving paternity justified the exclusion of rebutting evidence.
Until the recent development of human leococyte antigen (HLA)
testing,66 blood test results were not conclusive as to paternity
and were only indicative of non-paternity in certain combinations
of blood groups. 67 To admit such inconclusive results would have
wasted time and tended to confuse a jury. Because the weighing
of the possibilities would merely be guessing, where the husband
was one of the possible fathers he "must bear the burden of his
relation to the woman and be taken to be the father of her
child."68 The conclusive presumption of paternity, therefore, has
rested on evidentiary grounds as well as on "overriding social pol-
icy."
69
The procedural problems of proof which have traditionally
arisen in paternity actions can now be met in cases of surrogate
motherhood. HLA test results can establish paternity as well as
non-paternity with a high degree of probability.70 In addition, the
physician's record of the surrogate's insemination and the written
agreement between the surrogate and the donor can provide clear
and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of the surro-
gate's husband's paternity. The proposed provisions for informal,
pretrial hearings also can eliminate much unnecessary litiga-
tion.7 '
The policy justifications for section 621 that remain in tradi-
tional cases of disputed paternity can be satisfied by the rebutta-
ble presumptions of the Civil Code.72 California's 1975 enactment
of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) eliminated the need for the
conclusive presumption of paternity even as amended in 1980.73
Of those states enacting the UPA's rebuttable presumptions, only
California has also incorporated a conclusive presumption of pa-
ternity.7 4 Yet a conclusive presumption of paternity is inconsis-
66. See Hubbard, Goldstein, & Burger, Probability of Paternity: What Do the
Numbers Mean?, OR. ST. B. Buw , June 1980, at 12.
67. See Huntingdon v. Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 414 P.2d 382, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254
(1966).
68. In re Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 96, 183 P. 552, 557 (1919).
69. Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d at 619, 354 P.2d at 667-68, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 139-40
(1960). As amended in 1980, the statute permits the husband's interests to over-
come those of the state when he can prove he is not the child's father. Even in
traditional paternity cases, the state's social policies are not necessarily overrid-
ing.
70. See Hubbard, Goldstein, & Burger, Probability of Paternity: What Do the
Numbers Mean?, OR. ST. B. BULL., June 1980, at 12.
71. See note 110 infra.
72. CAr. Crv. CODE § 7004 (West Supp. 1980). See note 81 infra for full text.
73. CAL. CIrv. CODE §§ 7000-7018 (West Supp. 1980) (originally enacted as 1975
Cal. Stats. ch. 1244, effective Jan. 1, 1976).
74. "A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he meets the con-
ditions as set forth in Section 621 of the Evidence Code or in any of the following
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tent with the UPA's goal of ensuring equal rights for all children
regardless of the marital status of their parents. 5 Not only did
the Commissioners on Uniform Laws intend that "all presump-
tions of paternity [be] rebuttable in appropriate circumstances;" 76
the sponsors of California's version of the UPA also recognized
the inappropriateness of a conclusive presumption of paternity
where a rebuttable presumption fulfills the same goals. The spon-
sors' proposed repeal of Evidence Code section 621 was rejected
by the Committee on the Judiciary, however, and the conclusive
presumption was amended and retained.77
The 1980 amendment to section 621 creates a presumption
which is rebuttable in certain circumstances by the mother's hus-
band. As a limited rebuttable presumption, it duplicates part of
Civil Code section 7004(a)(1).78 To the extent that the presump-
tion is still conclusive, in that neither the mother nor a third party
may rebut it, it is unconstitutional.7 9 As either a rebuttable or a
conclusive presumption, it is unnecessary. Where family stabil-
ity, illegitimacy, and obligations of financial support are still valid
concerns, the rebuttable presumptions of paternity can fulfill
these objectives and allay the fears underlying the conclusive pre-
sumption. Because limited standing and the requirement of clear
and convincing evidence make even a rebuttable presumption of
paternity difficult to rebut,80 it is sufficiently strong to preserve
family integrity and protect children. In amending section 621 in
1980 the legislature indicated its willingness to admit blood test
results to prove non-paternity. Thus, it eliminated the procedural
justification for retaining a conclusive presumption of paternity.
Because both the policy and the procedural concerns supporting
a conclusive presumption have been met, section 621 can be re-
pealed.
subdivisions ... ." Ci_ Civ. CODE § 7004(a) (West Supp. 1980). See note 81 infra
for the full text of § 7004(a). Other jurisdictions which have adopted the Act are
Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-101 to -129 (1978); Hawaii, HAWAu REV. STAT.
§§ 584-1 to -26 (1976); Montana, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to -131 (1979);
North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-17-01 to -26 (Supp. 1977); Washington, WASH.
REv. CODE §§ 26.26.020 -.905 (1979); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120 (1977).
75. UIFoRM PARENTAGE AcT § 2, Commissioners' Comment.
76. UNIFoRm PARENTAGE ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
77. Cal. S. 347, Reg. Sess., 1975-76 J. SENATE 3774.
78. See note 81 infra.
79. See text accompanying notes 46-57 supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 91-97 infra.
THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
The rebuttable presumptions of paternity codified in Califor-
nia's version of the Uniform Parentage Act operate to maintain
family stability, protect the children of unwed mothers, and en-
force paternal support obligations.8 1 Because of California's
unique version of the UPA, however, those same rebuttable pre-
sumptions of paternity and related sections of the Act potentially
serve as additional barriers to surrogate motherhood. The UPA
was drafted to conform to the standards enunciated in Stanley v.
Illinois.82 Its purpose was to recognize the right of all children,
legitimate or not, to a legal relationship with both parents. The
purpose of the UPA's presumption of paternity was to identify the
father 3 against whom the child may assert that right.84 Because
81. (a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he meets
the conditions as set forth in Section 621 of the Evidence Code or in any of
the following subdivisions:
(1) He and the child's natural mother are or have been married to
each other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days
after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of inva-
lidity, or divorce, or after a decree of separation is entered by a court.
(2) Before the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have
attempted to marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent com-
pliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared
invalid, and,
(i) If the attempted marriage could be declared invalid only by a
court, the child is born during the attempted marriage, or within 300 days
after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or di-
vorce; or
(ii) If the attempted marriage is invalid without a court order, the
child is born within 300 days after the termination of cohabitation.
(3) After the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have
married, or attempted to marry, each other by a marriage solemnized in
apparent compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or
could be declared invalid, and
(i) With his consent, he is named as the child's father on the
child's birth certificate, or
(ii) He is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary
promise or by court order.
(4) He receives the child into his home and openly holds out the
child as his natural child.
(b) Except as provided in Section 621 of the Evidence Code, a pre-
sumption under this section is a rebuttable presumption affecting the bur-
den of proof and may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear
and convincing evidence. If two or more presumptions arise under this
section which conflict with each other, the presumption which on the facts
is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.
The presumption is rebutted by a court decree establishing paternity of
the child by another man.
CAL. CiV. CODE § 7004 (West Supp. 1980). The following discussion of the rebutta-
ble presumptions and the other obstacles of the Uniform Parentage Act assumes
that the conclusive presumption of paternity has been repealed.
82. UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note; Stanley v. Ii-
nois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
83. The Act also provides for the establishment of the mother and child rela-
tionship where it is in question. UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT § 21.
84. Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAM. L.Q. 1, 9 (1974).
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the drafters did not specifically provide for surrogate motherhood,
portions of the UPA create legal obstacles to surrogate arrange-
ments. California's version makes surrogate motherhood even
more difficult because the legislature failed to adopt certain sec-
tions which would have enabled a donor to establish his paternity
even where the surrogate is married.
Because he is not married to the surrogate and does not intend
to be, the donor can establish his paternity by only one method.85
Subsection 7004(a) (4) presumes him to be the natural father of
the child if he receives the child into his home and openly holds
out the child as his natural child.86 This method involves two po-
tential dangers for the donor seeking to claim paternity. First, the
surrogate may refuse to relinquish custody at birth, so that the
donor may not be able to receive the child and openly hold the
child out as his own.87 Second, despite the fact that the donor
may be presumed to be the child's natural father if he receives
the child into his home and openly holds the child out as his own,
if the surrogate is married, or had been married within 300 days
prior to the birth, her husband is also presumed to be the natural
85. CAL. Civ. CODE § 7004(a) (West Supp. 1980). Unless otherwise indicated,
all references to sections 7004 and 7006 are to the Civil Code.
86. Id. § 7004(a) (4).
87. The court is empowered to determine parentage and custodial rights in the
sequence it deems proper. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 7017(d) (West Supp. 1980). Two Cali-
fornia appellate courts have approved the award of custody to the natural father,
in spite of the mother's refusal to give her consent, in order to allow him to com-
plete the conduct necessary under § 7004(a) (4) to establish himself as the pre-
sumed father. In re Tricia M., 74 Cal. App. 3d 125, 141 Cal. Rptr. 554 (4th Dist.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1977); In re Reyna, 55 Cal. App. 3d 288, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 138 (5th Dist. 1976). The Court of Appeal for the Second District, however,
held differently and expressed its disapproval of Tricia. W.E.J. v. Superior Court,
100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (2d Dist. 1979); Adoption of Marie R., 79 Cal.
App. 3d 624, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122 (2d Dist. 1978). In Marie the mother had married.
The court said that regardless of which man was held to be the presumed father,
whose consent to adoption was required, "the baby will end up with a father." Id.
at 629, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 126 (2d Dist. 1978). In W.E.J. v. Superior Court, the court
interpreted the legislative intent of § 7017(d) as the protection of the child's best
interests, as opposed to the preferences of a "purely biological father," and re-
fused to award custody to the natural father so that he could become a presumed
father under § 7004(a) (4). W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d at 312, 160
Cal. Rptr. at 868 (2d Dist. 1979). Although consent to adoption was the issue in
these cases, the holdings point out the courts' conflicting interpretations of
§ 7017(d). If the surrogate refuses to let the donor take the child into his home,
some courts may not award him custody under § 7017(d), thus preventing him
from establishing his paternity under § 7004(a) (4).
father of the child under subsection 7004(a) (1).88 Subsection
7004(b) provides that when two or more conflicting presumptions
arise, "the presumption which on the facts is founded on the
weightier considerations of policy and logic controls." 89 The re-
lated sections of California's Uniform Parentage Act dealing with
standing9O make it difficult for the donor to prove that the pre-
sumption of his paternity under subsection 7004(a) (4) is based on
weightier considerations than the presumption of the surrogate's
husband's paternity. The California UPA permits any interested
party to bring an action to determine the existence or nonexis-
tence of a father and child relationship presumed under subsec-
tion 7004(a) (4). However, only the child, his natural mother, or a
man presumed to be the child's father under subsections
7004(a) (1), 7004(a) (2), or 7004(a) (3) may bring an action to deter-
mine the existence or nonexistence of the relationship presumed
under one of those three subsections. 91 While the donor may
88. CAL. Civ. CODE § 7004(a) (1) (West Supp. 1980).
89. Id. § 7004(b).
90. Id. § 7006. See text accompanying notes 91-97 infra. Restricting standing is
consistent with the policy underlying both the conclusive and the rebuttable pre-
sumptions of paternity, that family integrity should not be impugned by a third
party. But see note 93 infra.
91. (a) A child, the child's natural mother, or a man presumed to be his
father under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 7004,
may bring an action as follows:
(1) At any time for the purpose of declaring the existence of the fa-
ther and child relationship presumed under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of
subdivision (a) of Section 7004.
(2) For the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father and
child relationship presumed under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subdivi-
sion (a) of Section 7004 only if the action is brought within a reasonable
time after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts. After the presumption
has been rebutted, paternity of the child by another man may be deter-
mined in the same action, if he has been made a party.
(b) Any interested party may bring an action at any time for the pur-
pose of determining the existence or nonexistence of the father and child
relationship presumed under paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) of Section
7004.
(c) An action to determine the existence of the father and child rela-
tionship with respect to a child who has no presumed father under Sec-
tion 7004 or whose presumed father is deceased may be brought by the
child or personal representative of the child, the State Department of So-
cial Services, the mother or the personal representative or a parent of the
mother if the mother has died or is a minor, a man alleged or alleging him-
self to be the father, or the personal representative or a parent of the al-
leged father if the alleged father has died or is a minor. The
commencement of such an action shall suspend any pending proceeding
in connection with the adoption of such child, including a proceeding pur-
suant to subdivision (b) of Section 7017, until a judgment in the action is
final
(d) Except as to cases coming within the provisions of Section 621 of
the Evidence Code, a man not a presumed father may bring an action for
the purpose of declaring that he is the natural father of a child having a
presumed father under Section 7004, if the mother relinquishes for, con-
sents to, or proposes to relinquish for or consent to, the adoption of the
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bring an action to establish his own paternity once he receives
the child into his home, he lacks standing to declare the nonexis-
tence of the relationship between the child and the husband of a
married surrogate. Although the married surrogate, her husband,
or the child could bring an action to rebut the presumption of the
paternity of the surrogate's husband and then to establish that of
the donor, this would be awkward and inconvenient. 92 Further-
more, this procedure requires the cooperation of the surrogate
and her husband. If they decided to keep the child, the donor
would lack standing to rebut the presumption of the surrogate's
husband's paternity.
93
child. Such an action shall be brought within 30 days after the man is
served as prescribed in subdivision (f) of Section 7017 with a notice that
he is or could be the father of such child or the birth of the child, which-
ever is later. The commencement of such action shall suspend any pend-
ing proceeding in connection with the adoption of such child until a
judgment in the action is final.
(e) Regardless of its terms, an agreement between an alleged or pre-
sumed father and the mother or child does not bar an action under this
section.
(f) An action under this section may be brought before the birth of the
child.
(g) The district attorney may also bring an action under this section in
any case in which he believes that the interests of justice will be served
thereby.
CAi. Crv. CODE § 7006 (West Supp. 1980).
92. Id. § 7006(a). Theoretically, the donor could prevail upon the district attor-
ney to bring the action under § 7006(g). The original paternity action in Cramer v.
Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979), was brought by the district
attorney under CAT. CIrv. CODE § 231 (replaced by § 7006). See text accompanying
notes 105-08 infra.
By an even more circuitous route, the donor may have standing under § 7006(d),
which permits a man not a presumed father to bring an action to declare he is the
child's natural father, even where the child has a presumed father under § 7004(a),
if the mother attempts to place the child for adoption. Since the surrogate pro-
poses to relinquish the child for adoption by the donor's wife, the donor may bring
an action under § 7006(d) to establish his paternity. This method is procedurally
unsatisfactory. Not until the surrogate offers the child to the adoptive mother can
the natural father even bring an action to determine his paternity. Furthermore,
this provision does not afford the donor any protection if the surrogate attempts to
keep the child. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006(d) (West Supp. 1980).
93. A statute under which an unwed father lacks standing to prove his own pa-
ternity may be unconstitutional as a denial of due process, because the fundamen-
tal right of childbearing is affected. See text accompanying notes 46-52 supra. The
question of standing in a paternity action was the focus of In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d
636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975). CAT_ EvID. CODE § 661 (superseded by
Civil Code §§ 7004 and 7006) limited the right to dispute the presumption of pater-
nity to the woman, her husband, or their descendants, or to the state in a criminal
action. CAT. EVD. CODE § 661 (repealed by 1975 Cal. Stats., ch. 1244). The Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that such a presumption, precluding the unwed father's
right to offer evidence that he was the father of the child, denied him due process.
In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d at 651, 532 P.2d at 133, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485. The decision
An examination of the parallel sections in Washington's version
of the Uniform Parentage Act suggests a statutory solution to the
problem of standing.94 Like California Civil Code section 7006(a),
the comparable Washington section provides that the child, the
natural mother, or a man presumed by statute to be the child's fa-
ther may bring an action to declare the existence or nonexistence
of paternity.95 An additional provision permits any interested
party, the department of social and health services, or the state to
bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of pa-
ternity regardless of the source of the presumption of paternity.9 6
Thus, under the Washington version of the UPA, the donor, as an
interested party, could bring an action to rebut the presumption
of paternity of the surrogate's husband and to establish himself
as the father of the child.
Using the Washington statute as a guide, the California legisla-
ture should amend subsection 7006(b) to permit any interested
party to bring an action to determine the existence or nonexis-
tence of paternity without reference to the specific presumptions
of section 7004(a). The state need not fear that hordes of litigious
unmarried men will demand parental rights. Only those who in
good faith believe they have fathered children, who have a genu-
ine interest in their children, and who are willing to support those
children are likely to bring actions to rebut the presumption of
paternity of the mother's husband. Additionally, the provisions
for informal hearings would serve as a safeguard against unjusti-
fied litigation in traditional cases of questioned paternity.9 7 In
cases of surrogate motherhood, under a modification of section
7006(b), the donor would have standing to rebut the presumption
that the married surrogate's husband is the father of the child.
was limited to the particular circumstances, however. In Lisa the unwed father
had lived with the child's mother before and after birth, and, as in Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), both Lisa's presumed father and her natural mother had
died. The court insisted that future decisions concerning an unwed father's right
to offer evidence to rebut a presumption of paternity must depend "on circum-
stances prevailing in each particular case." In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d at 651, 532 P.2d
at 133, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485 n.17. It is not yet clear whether Lisa would apply to
give a donor standing to rebut a presumption of paternity of the surrogate's hus-
band where both the surrogate and her husband were still living. See Comment,
The Uniform Parentage Act: What It Will Mean for the Putative Father in Calfor-
nia, 28 HASTINGS LJ. 191 (1976).
94. WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.040, .060 (1979).
95. Id. § 26.26.060(1).
96. Id. § 26.26.060(2) (1979). This represents a change from the original draft of
the UPA, which permitted an interested party to bring an action only to determine
the relationship presumed under the 4th condition (reception of the child into the
man's home) or under the 5th, which California omitted completely, see text ac-
companying notes 112-24 infra. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 6(b).
97. See note 110 infra.
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Even if the California donor had standing to bring an action to
determine that a married surrogate's husband was not the child's
father, he would then have the burden of proof in any such action
to rebut the presumption of paternity by clear and convincing evi-
dence98 and to establish his own paternity. Section 895 of the Cal-
ifornia Evidence Code permits the donor to produce blood test
results to prove the non-paternity of the married surrogate's hus-
band.99 This still leaves the donor with the burden of establishing
his own paternity. That burden will be especially heavy if the
surrogate attempts to keep the child and thus precludes the do-
nor from establishing paternity under subsection 7004(a) (4).
California's versions of two Uniform Laws make it particularly
difficult for the donor to introduce the affirmative evidence most
likely to prove his paternity. First, the Uniform Act on Blood
Tests to Determine Paternity provided that blood test results in-
dicating non-paternity would be conclusive evidence that the al-
leged father was not the father of the child, while blood *test
results showing the possibility of paternity were admissible
within the discretion of the court 100 California's counterpart,
however, permits blood test evidence only to indicate non-pater-
nity. It omits the last sentence of the Uniform Act provision
which would have permitted the court to admit blood test results
showing paternity when warranted by the infrequency of blood
type.lOl Second, in enacting the Uniform Parentage Act in 1975,
the California legislature omitted section 12 of the draft UPA,
once again rejecting the affirmative use of blood test results to
show paternity.102 Viewing these omissions as intentional, the
98. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(b) (West Supp. 1980).
99. If the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed
by the evidence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the
father of the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly.
If the experts disagree in their findings or conclusions, the question shall
be submitted upon all the evidence.
CAL. Evm. CODE § 895 (West 1966). See Huntingdon v. Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 414
P.2d 382, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1966).
100. The current counterpart provision is UNiFORM ACT ON PATERNIrY § 10, 9A
UmFoRm LAWS ANNOTATED 635 (1979).
101. CA. Evin. CODE § 895 (West 1966). The omitted portion reads: "If the ex-
perts conclude that the blood tests show the possibility of the alleged father's pa-
ternity, admission of this evidence is within the discretion of the court, depending
upon the infrequency of the blood type." UNIFoRm AcT ON PATERNITY § 10. An
amendment to CAt. EVID. CODE § 895 introduced in the 1979-80 Regular Session of
the Legislature died in committee.
102. Evidence relating to paternity may include:
courts have admitted blood test evidence to prove non-pater-
nitylO3 but have excluded such evidence when it tends to prove
paternity.10 4 Under these judicial interpretations of current stat-
utes, the donor may introduce blood test results only to prove
that the surrogate's husband is not the father of the child, not to
prove the donor's own paternity.
The recent California Court of Appeal decision in Cramer v.
Morrison recognizes medical advances in blood test procedures
and calls for a legislative modification of Evidence Code section
895.105 In Cramer the court conceded that the omission of section
12 of the UPA may have indicated the California legislature's in-
tent to exclude blood test evidence tending to prove paternity.0 6
Nevertheless, the court concluded, the legislature meant the
omission to refer only to the standard Landsteiner (red cell)
blood grouping tests, not to the more precise human leucocyte an-
tigen (HLA) or tissue typing tests, which were not standard prac-
tice in 1975.107 According to the holding in Cramer, the donor
could introduce HLA test results as evidence to prove that he is
the father of the surrogate's child. Now that medical science has
developed more reliable tests for paternity, the California legisla-
ture should join the Cramer court in recognizing the usefulness of
such tests in actions to establish the father and child relationship.
Amending California's Evidence Code section 895 to conform to
the UPA would give the court discretion to admit red cell group-
ing or HLA test results where such results are highly probative of
paternity.1
08
Adopting section 12 of the UPA would permit not only blood
(1) evidence of sexual intercourse between the mother and alleged fa-
ther at any possible time of conception;
(2) an expert's opinion concerning the statistical probability of the al-
leged father's paternity based upon the duration of the mother's preg-
nancy,
(3) blood test results, weighted in accordance with evidence, if avail-
able, of the statistical probability of the alleged father's paternity;
(4) medical or anthropological evidence relating to the alleged father's
paternity of the child based on tests performed by experts. If a man has
been identified as a possible father of the child, the court may, and upon
request of a party shall, require the child, the mother, and the man to sub-
mit to appropriate tests; and
(5) all other evidence relevant to the issue of paternity of the child.
UNwFoRM PARENTAGE AcT § 12.
103. E.g., Huntingdon v. Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 414 P.2d 382, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254
(1966).
104. E.g., Dodd v. Henkel, 84 Cal. App. 3d 604, 148 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1978).
105. Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979).
106. Id. at 881, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
107. Id. at 883, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
108. See generally Hubbard, Goldstein, & Burger, Probability of Paternity:
What Do the Numbers Mean?, OR. ST. B. BuLL, June 1980, at 12. Because of the
recent development of HLA testing, the legislature should modify the last clause
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test results, but "all other evidence relevant to the issue of pater-
nity of the child."109 Such evidence could include the physician's
record of the surrogate's artificial insemination with the donor's
semen and the written agreement between the donor and the sur-
rogate. This would not lead to a flood of complicated litigation,
since the admissibility of such evidence would rest on the sound
discretion of the court, which could examine the blood test re-
sults, the physician's record, and the agreement in a pretrial hear-
ing.110 Section 12 of the UPA merely provides that "evidence
relating to paternity may include" any evidence relevant to the
paternity of the child."' It does not require the court to admit all
evidence proposed by any man claiming to be a father. The court
could, on the grounds of public policy, still exclude evidence
which would defeat a socially desirable presumption of paternity.
Some evidence would be deemed irrelevant. Furthermore, clear
and convincing proof would still be necessary to rebut a presump-
tion of paternity. Even with these safeguards, the enactment of
section 12 of the UPA would at least give the California donor the
opportunity to introduce the evidence necessary, not only to re-
but the presumption of another man's paternity, but also to prove
his own.
The donor's task of establishing himself as the father of the sur-
rogate's child appears to be simplified when the surrogate is not
and has not been married. Subsection 7006(c) of the California
Civil Code permits a putative father to bring an action to deter-
mine his relationship to a child who has no presumed father
of its version of § 10 of the Uniform Act on Paternity to include HILA as well as
"blood group" tests.
109. UNIFomr PARENTAGE AcT § 12(5).
110. In adopting § 12 of the UPA, the legislature should also enact §§ 10, 11, and
13, which California's version also omitted. Section 10 provides for an informal
hearing before a judge or referee from which the public is barred and at which the
rules of evidence need not be observed. Section 11 permits the court to require
the child, the mother, or the alleged father to submit to blood tests performed by
experts. Under § 13, the judge or referee may recommend dismissal of the action,
a compromise involving the alleged father's economic obligation, or the alleged fa-
ther's acknowledgment of his paternity. If the parties accept the recommendation,
judgment shall be entered accordingly. Otherwise, the action shall be set for trial.
UNIFoRM PARENTAGE ACT §§ 10, 11, 13. The drafters of the Act anticipated that
these pretrial procedures would "greatly reduce the current high cost and ineffi-
ciency of paternity litigation." UNEmoRm PARENTAGE ACT, Commissioners' Prefa-
tory Note.
111. UNi'om PARENTAGE ACT § 12 (emphasis added).
under section 7004(a).112 However, California's UPA does not ad-
equately provide the means by which a man bringing such a suit
may introduce proof of his paternal relationship to the child. Sec-
tion 7003 provides only two ways to establish paternity: one
under the Uniform Parentage Act and the other by proof of adop-
tion.113 Presently, the only method by which a donor can estab-
lish paternity in Califonia is under subsection 7004(a) (4) by
receiving the child into his home.1l 4 Thus, even though the donor
may have standing to bring an action to determine his paternity
when the surrogate is not married and the child has no presumed
father, he has no practical means to establish his relationship
with the child if the surrogate prevents him from taking the child
into his home.
The most practical solution to this problem is the adoption of
subsection 4(a) (5) of the draft UPA."15 This subsection would
serve as the general equivalent of the Michigan and Kentucky
provisions, which permit a putative father to acknowledge his pa-
ternity of a child.116 The legislature should not require the father
to acknowledge his paternity before birth, as does Michigan, but
should allow acknowledgment to be made either before or after
the birth of the child.117 This method would allow the putative fa-
ther to wait for blood test results before acknowledging his pater-
nity.
No obvious reason appears for the California legislature's fail-
ure to enact this subsection of the draft Act.1l8 Arguably, the pro-
vision could "impugn family integrity"1"9 where a man other than
the husband has fathered a child. Such a family's integrity might
112. CAL. CirV. CODE § 7006(c) (West Supp. 1980).
113. Id. § 7003.
114. Id. § 7004(a)(4).
115. (a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if.
(5) he acknowledges his paternity of the child in a writing filed with
the (appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau), which shall promptly
inform the mother of the filing of the acknowledgment, and she does not
dispute the acknowledgment within a reasonable time after being in-
formed thereof, in a writing filed with the (appropriate court or Vital Sta-
tistics Bureau). If another man is presumed under this section to be the
child's father, acknowledgment may be effected only with the written con-
sent of the presumed father or after the presumption has been rebutted.
UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a) (5).
116. See text accompanying notes 13-14 and 24 supra.
117. A similar Michigan statute replaced by McH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 710.33
(West 1980) has been criticized for providing for acknowledgment only before
birth. Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAm. LQ. 1, 13 (1974).
118. Except for California and Wyoming, the jurisdictions adopting the UPA
have included this provision. See note 74 supra.
119. Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 619, 354 P.2d 657, 688, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129, 140
(1960).
364
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be considered already impugned, however, regardless of any legal
relationships. Proposed subsection 7004(a) (5) would not create a
rash of broken families, because the provision includes two safe-
guards. First, although acknowledged under this section, pater-
nity will not be presumed if the mother disputes the
acknowledgment within a reasonable time after receiving notice.
Second, if another man (e.g., her husband) is presumed under
subsections 7004(a) (1), 7004(a) (2), 7004(a) (3), or 7004(a) (4) to be
the child's father, acknowledgment may be effected only with the
written consent of the presumed father or after the presumption
has been rebutted.120 When another man claims paternity and
the mother does not dispute his claim but her husband does, she
would still be required to rebut the presumption of her husband's
paternity in order to establish the other man as the father of the
child.121
In any of three possible surrogate motherhood situations, the
adoption of subsection 4(a) (5) of the UPA would greatly facilitate
the establishment of the donor's paternity. If the surrogate were
married and all parties agreed that the donor was the child's fa-
ther, the donor could acknowledge his paternity; the surrogate
would not dispute the acknowledgement; and her husband would
give his consent in writing. No other presumptions would need
apply. The donor would be the presumed father of the child
under proposed subsection 7004(a) (5) of the California Civil
Code. If the surrogate were single and fulfilled her agreement to
surrender custody, the donor would be afforded an alternative,
and considerably safer, method of establishing paternity than
through subsection 7004(a) (4).122 Under proposed subsection
7004(a) (5), a donor could acknowledge his paternity even before
birth and thus be legally established as the child's father before
taking the child into his home. If the surrogate, married or single,
attempted to keep the child and a custody battle ensued, subsec-
tion 7004(a) (5) would provide the donor with the opportunity to
offer at least some evidence of his paternity. 23 Absent a custody
120. UNrFoRM PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a) (5).
121. See text accompanying notes 91-111 upra.
122. See text accompanying notes 85-88 supra.
123. See CAL. CiM. CODE § 4600 (West 1980). Under this section, the court may
award custody to a non-parent, but only if it finds that an award of custody to a
parent would be detrimental to the child. Unless an award of custody to the surro-
gate would be detrimental to the child, the court will probably not award custody
to the donor if he has not established himself as a presumed parent.
struggle, the provision for establishing paternity by acknowledg-
ment would enable the donor to become the child's presumed fa-
ther whether the surrogate were married or unmarried. The
enactment of the provision would also bring California's legisla-
tion into conformity with that of other states adopting the Uni-
form Parentage Act.124
This modification, together with the other amendments to sec-
tions 7004 and 7006 proposed herein, would eliminate major statu-
tory obstacles to surrogate motherhood in California. Authorizing
any interested party to rebut a presumption of paternity, allowing
the admission of blood test results and other relevant evidence to
rebut the presumption, and allowing a putative father to acknowl-
edge his paternity in an appropriate writing would permit a donor
to establish his paternity of a child born to a surrogate mother.
THE ARTBc.AL INSEMINATION STATUTE
The above proposals regarding the rebuttable presumptions of
paternity assume that the conclusive presumption of paternity
has been repealed and that no other legal obstacles to the proce-
dures used in surrogate motherhood remain. Yet the UPA pro-
vides another legal barrier to the donor's attempt to establish
paternity. California's artificial insemination statute denies pa-
rental rights to the donor of semen used in the artificial insemina-
tion of a woman not his wife.' 25
With some changes, the California legislature adopted the offi-
cial text of the artificial insemination section of the UPA.126 By
providing for the use of donor semen without awarding any pa-
rental rights to the donor, the drafters intended to assure the
124. See notes 74 and 118 supra.
125. (a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the
consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen
donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he
were the natural father of a child thereby conceived. The husband's con-
sent must be in writing and signed by him and his wife. The physician
shall certify their signatures and the date of the insemination, and retain
the husband's consent as part of the medical record, where it shall be kept
confidential and in a sealed file. However, the physician's failure to do so
does not affect the father and child relationship. All papers and records
pertaining to the insemination, whether part of the permanent record of a
court or of a file held by the supervising physician or elsewhere, are sub-
ject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good cause shown.
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in ar-
tificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in
law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1980). This discussion of the artificial insemi-
nation statute assumes that the other obstacles to surrogate motherhood have
been eliminated.
126. See note 132 infra.
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rights of children so conceived and to carry out the Act's general
goal of family integrity.127 When California enacted the UPA in
1975, artificial insemination by donor (AID) was used almost ex-
clusively to impregnate the fertile wife of a sterile husband. The
statute ensured that the sterile husband, rather than the donor,
would be the child's legally recognized father. Since then, family
planning has developed the reverse procedure, the insemination
of a surrogate so that a fertile husband and his infertile wife may
have a child. In surrogate motherhood, the couple wishes to en-
sure that the semen donor is the legal father of the child. Section
7005 precludes his parental rights.128
Subsection 7005(a) alone does not necessarily prevent the do-
nor from becoming the legally recognized father of a child born to
a surrogate, because in order for the wife's husband to be treated
legally as the natural father of the child, he must give his written
consent to the artificial insemination.129 Under this subsection, if
the husband of a married surrogate withheld his consent or, af-
firmatively, signed a statement denying that the child so con-
C'
127. See generally Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAm. L.Q. 1 (1974).
128. CAL. Crv. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1980). All references to § 7005 are to the
Civil Code.
129. Presumably, the purpose of a consent requirement is to free the husband
from support obligations incurred by a wife who independently seeks artificial in-
semination in order to have a child that her husband does not want. The underly-
ing assumption is that the decision to procreate, even through artificial
insemination, is a joint decision of the couple; a husband should not be required to
support his wife's child if he did not consent to its conception. Likewise, in requir-
ing a husband to support his child, Penal Code § 270 states in part: 'The husband
of a woman who bears a child as a result of artificial insemination shall be consid-
ered the father of that child for the purpose of this section, if he consented in writ-
ing to the artificial insemination." CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1980). Yet
the presumptions of paternity, rebuttable or conclusive, hold otherwise: the hus-
band, simply by virtue of his marital relationship to the woman, is presumed to be
the father of her child. If § 7005(a) is to be interpreted as requiring the husband's
consent before he will be legally recognized as the child's father, the law creates
an interesting double standard. Where the wife conceives through artificial insem-
ination, the husband, by withholding his consent, is not treated in law as the
child's natural father. Where the wife conceives through sexual intercourse with
another man, however, in which case the husband probably has not consented, the
presumptions of paternity apply and the husband is presumed to be the natural
father of the child in spite of his failure to consent. The non-consenting husband
thus becomes responsible for children born to his wife through her sexual inter-
course with other men but not for those she conceived through AID. Furthermore,
since section 7005(b) precludes the donor from being legally treated as the natural
father of the child, the ironic effect of § 7005 in a case in which the husband has
not consented to AID is to deny the child the right to a legal relationship with ei-
ther man.
ceived was his, the law might not treat the husband as the natural
father of the surrogate's child. The donor then would be free to
establish his paternity. 30 Subsection 7005(b), however, precludes
the donor from being considered the child's natural father.'31 Be-
cause subsection 7005(b) applies whether the surrogate is mar-
ried or unmarried, this statute is potentially a greater obstacle
than the presumptions of paternity, which present a problem only
when the surrogate is married.132 Like subsection 7005(a), sub-
section 7005(b) serves a valid purpose: it protects (usually anony-
mous) donors from legal responsibility for children conceived
through the use of their semen. 33 In the traditional case of AID,
the donor wishes to avoid that legal responsibility; in the case of
surrogate motherhood, he wishes to assume it. As presently en-
acted, subsection 7005(b) does not allow a donor to assume paren-
tal responsibility.134
One approach to this problem is to repeal subsection 7005(b),
because subsection 7005(a) affords the donor the same protection.
If a woman's husband is treated in law as if he were the natural
father, the donor must be treated as if he were not. In fact, prior
to the enactment of the UPA, California's artificial insemination
statute did not mention the legal treatment of the donor in such a
case.135 In addition, most states that have enacted artificial in-
semination legislation have made no specific reference to the do-
nor's rights.1
36
130. See text accompanying notes 115-21 supra.
131. CAI CIV. CODE § 7005(b) (West Supp. 1980).
132. Although the official text of the UPA specifies the artificial insemination
"of a married woman other than the donor's wife," the California, Washington,
Wyoming, and Colorado versions eliminated the word "married." UNIFORM PAR-
ENTAGE ACT § 5(b). Assuming the omission was intentional, § 7005(b) permits the
artificial insemination of an unmarried woman. The reference in § 7005(a) to "a
wife" appears to express merely the concern with the husband's responsibilities
and rights in those cases in which the woman is married; it does not require that
the woman be married.
133. Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALrF. L REv. 611, 614 (1978).
134. The semen donor may be able to waive the right conferred by § 7005(b). If
so, the statute need not be amended as proposed herein.
135. CAL. Crv. CODE § 216 (repealed by 1975 Cal. Stats., ch. 1244). The statute
specified that a child born to a woman as a result of conception through artificial
insemination, to which her husband had consented in writing, was legitimate if the
birth occurred during the marriage or within 300 days after its dissolution.
136. ALASKA STAT. § 20.20.010 (1975); Any. STAT. Am. § 61-141(c) (1971); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 74.101.1 (1973); LA. Crv.
CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1981); MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b)
(1974); MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 333.2824(6), 700.111(2) (West 1980); N.Y. DoM.
REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1976); OxLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10 § 551-53 (West Supp. 1980-81); VA. CODE § 64.1-7.1 (1980). The Connecticut,
Oregon, and Texas counterparts to § 7005(b) provide that no donor of semen used
in AID shall have any right in any resulting child. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-69j (West
Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239 (1979-80); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(b)
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As adopted by the California legislature, however, subection
7005(b) does add a significant element not covered in subsection
7005(a), since subsection 7005(b) does not limit AID to married
women. 3 7 Without this provision, the courts might interpret sub-
section 7005(a) as permitting the artificial insemination only of
"wives." Although its protection of the donor's status seems re-
dundant in light of subsection 7005(a), assuming the legislature's
intent was to provide for the artificial insemination of unmarried
as well as married women, subsection 7005 (b) should be retained.
Rather than repeal subsection 7005(b), the legislature should
amend the statute to permit the donor to claim paternity in cer-
tain cases. The Washington legislature made such a modification
in enacting its version of the UPA's artificial insemination provi-
sions. 138 The Washington statute implies that an agreement be-
tween the donor and the inseminated woman would conclusively
establish the donor's paternity.139 The amended California stat-
ute should provide instead that such an agreement be weighed
along with other evidence. Pretrial hearings then could deter-
mine paternity according to the facts in each case.14o
As enacted, the Washington statute could weaken the policy
favoring family integrity which underlies the UPA and its pre-
sumptions of paternity. Where the woman inseminated is mar-
ried, the statutory exception permits a man other than the
mother's husband to establish paternity apparently without refer-
ence to the husband's consent.' 4 ' Where she is unmarried, the
(Vernon 1975). Apparently only these three states and those which have adopted
§ 5 of the UPA (California, Colorado, Montana, Washington, and Wyoming) have
expressly protected the donor's freedom from legal responsibility for a child con-
ceived through AID. See note 74 supra.
137. See note 132 supra.
138. (2) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in
artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in
law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived un-
less the donor and the woman agree in writing that said donor shall be the
father. The agreement must be in writing and signed by the donor and
the woman. The physician shall certify their signatures and the date of
the insemination and Me the agreement with the registrar of vital statis-
tics, where it shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050(2) (1979).
139. Although the Washington statute does not state that such an agreement is
conclusive, by providing that the donor is treated as if he were not the father "un-
less" he and the woman have agreed, it suggests that when they have made such
an agreement, he will be so treated. Id.
140. See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
141. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050(2) (1979); see note 129 supra.
clause recognizes parenthood without marriage. 42 While this
may no longer constitute a social stigma, the California legislature
may not be ready to condone the practice by statute. In addition,
the drafters of the UPA realized that the section on artificial in-
semination would not cover all possible cases involving AID.143
Although the Washington legislature may have had surrogate
motherhood in mind when adopting its revised version of the
UPA's artificial insemination statute,'l4 the exception provided for
in the Washington statute might also affect cases of AID not yet
envisioned.145
Amending subsection 7005(b) to permit an agreement between
the donor and the surrogate to be admitted along with other evi-
dence would give the court discretion in meeting new situations
in which policy considerations could demand-or preclude-the
semen donor's paternity. If a married woman had been artificially
inseminated without her husband's knowledge or consent while
continuing sexual relations with him, a court might find the hus-
band, rather than the donor, to be the legal father of the child, in
spite of a written agreement between the woman and the donor.
If an unmarried couple had agreed to have their own child
through artificial insemination, the court could apply the excep-
tion clause and establish the paternity of the semen donor. 46
And if a surrogate mother, married or unmarried, had been artifi-
cially inseminated with the semen of the husband of an adoptive
couple, with all parties agreeing in writing that the donor was the
father of the child, the court could find that such an agreement re-
142. Even in this situation, the Washington statute does carry out the objective
of the UPA, the establishment of the child's right to legitimacy regardless of the
marital relationship of his parents.
143. See UmFORM PARENTAGE AcT § 5, Commissioners' Comment. ('This Act
does not deal with many complex and serious legal problems raised by the prac-
tice of artificial insemination.")
144. Letter from former Washington State Senator Peter D. Francis to the au-
thor (Oct. 8, 1980) (on file with the author).
145. For instance, the Washington statute appears to reflect the unusual situa-
tion of C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977). An unmarried woman
contemplating marriage with a friend wished him to father her child but did not
wish to have sexual intercourse before their marriage. He agreed to provide the
semen for her artificial insemination and assumed he would be treated as the nat-
ural father of the child. The couple broke off their relationship during the preg-
nancy. The woman subsequently kept the baby and the man applied for visitation
rights. In holding that the man was entitled to visitation rights as the natural fa-
ther of the child, the court took notice of the couple's pre-conception agreement
that the donor would assume the responsibilities of parenthood. In enacting Re-
vised Code § 26.26.050(2) in 1975 it is unlikely that the Washington legislature envi-
sioned the situation of C.M. and C.C. Nevertheless, a similar written agreement
between a Washington couple would appear to be covered by the Washington stat-
ute. See Smith, A Close Encounter of the First Kind: Artificial Insemination and
an Enlightened Judiciary, 17 J. FAm. L 41 (1978-79).
146. The situation described in note 145 supra would fall under this category.
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butted any other presumptions of paternity and that the donor
was the legal and natural father of the child. Amending subsec-
tion 7005(b) to permit the donor to be treated in law as if he were
the natural father in certain circumstances would enable the do-
nor to establish his paternity in a case involving surrogate moth-
erhood yet would retain flexibility to deal with other situations
involving artificial insemination.
PROHIBIONS AGAINST PAYMENT TO SURROGATES
Although the statutory modifications discussed above would fa-
cilitate surrogate motherhood, California law should still prohibit
payment to the surrogate. 47 While amending certain provisions
of the Evidence and Civil Codes is necessary to allow for surro-
gate motherhood, 4 6 repealing or changing sections 273(a) or 181
of the Penal Code to permit payment of the surrogate is not rec-
ommended. These sections carry out strong social policies
against the sale of children, 49 and their proscription of payment
does not proscribe surrogate motherhood itself.50 Furthermore,
permitting the surrogate to be compensated would create a host
of new problems. 51
On its face, neither section 273(a) nor section 181 of the Penal
147. It is a misdemeanor for any person or agency to offer to pay money or
anything of value, or to pay money or anything of value, to a parent for the
placement for adoption, for the consent to an adoption, or for cooperation
in the completion of an adoption of his child. This section does not make
it unlawful to pay the maternity-connected medical or hospital and neces-
sary living expenses of the mother preceding and during confinement as
an act of charity, as long as the payment is not contingent upon placement
of the child for adoption, consent to the adoption, or cooperation in the
completion of the adoption.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 1970).
Every person who holds, or attempts to hold, any person in involuntary
servitude, or assumes, or attempts to assume, rights of ownership over
any person, or who sells, or attempts to sell, any person to another, or re-
ceives money or anything of value, in consideration of placing any person
in the custody, or under the power or control of another, or who buys, or
attempts to buy, any person, or pays money, or delivers anything of value,
to another, in consideration of having any person placed in his custody, or
under his power or control, or who knowingly aids or assists in any man-
ner any one thus offending, is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison for two, three or four years.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 181 (West Supp. 1980).
148. See text accompanying notes 58-80, 94-97, 105-12, 115-24 138-46 supra.
149. See text accompanying notes 155-59 infra.
150. See text accompanying notes 184-87 infra.
151. See text accompanying notes 188-94 infra.
Code presents an unsurmountable obstacle to payment to a sur-
rogate. Under section 273(a), it is a misdemeanor to pay or offer
to pay anything of value to a parent for the placement for adop-
tion, for consent to adoption, or for cooperation in the completion
of adoption of a child.152 Applied to surrogate motherhood, this
section would prohibit payment to the surrogate for her coopera-
tion in the eventual adoption of the child. The donor himself,
however, is not involved in the adoption of the child; it is his wife
who adopts the child from the surrogate. As long as the donor's
payment to the surrogate is independent of his wife's subsequent
adoption of the child, such payment may be permissible under
section 273(a).153 If the payment is in exchange for the surro-
gate's relinquishment of parental rights as a prerequisite for the
eventual adoption by the donor's wife, however, the payment ap-
pears to violate the statute. If the fee is paid not for the surro-
gate's relinquishment of rights but for her consent to the donor's
cistody of the child, it violates section 181, prohibiting the deliv-
ery or receipt of anything of value in exchange for custody of a
person. 54 Under section 273(a), the donor or his wife may not
pay the surrogate for the surrogate's consent to the wife's adop-
tion. Under section 181, the donor may not pay the surrogate for
her consent to his custody. Together, these two statutes appear to
preclude legal payment to the surrogate for the transfer of cus-
tody of the child or for her relinquishment of parental rights.
Both statutes reflect strong public policies in which the state
has compelling interests. Section 273(a) militates specifically
against black market baby sales 55 and rests on several policy
considerations. Children should not be treated as chattels which
can be bought and sold.156 Financial gain should not be the pri-
mary motivating factor encouraging a natural parent to relinquish
152. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 1970). References to §§ 273(a) and 181 are
to the Penal Code.
153. This is the procedure which has been used in Kentucky, where KY. REV.
STAT. § 199.590(2) (1975) prohibits payment for adoption. It can be argued that the
donor has conspired with his wife or is acting as her agent in the adoption transac-
tion. See note 195 infra.
154. CAL. PENAL CODE § 181 (West Supp. 1980).
155. According to public hearings held in 1975 by the U.S. Senate Subcommit-
tee on Children and Youth, a flourishing baby-selling business in New York, Penn-
sylvania, Florida, and Ohio involved payments of up to $25,000 for healthy, white
infants. Podolski, Abolishing Baby Buying: Limiting Independent Adoption Place-
ment, 9 FA. LQ. 547, 548 (1975).
156. Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CAu7'. L REV. 611, 613 (1978). In
upholding the Michigan statute prohibiting payment of fees, in January 1980 Judge
Roman Gribbs stated: "It is a fundamental principle that children should not and
cannot be bought and sold." Castillo, When Women Bear Children for Others, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 22, 1980, § B, at 6, col 2.
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parental rights.'5 7 Intermediaries should not be given an opportu-
nity to profit from the adoption transaction.158 Section 181 applies
similar policies in expanding the scope of the proscription to in-
clude involuntary servitude and the infringement of personal lib-
erty as well as paid transfers of custody. Repeal of Penal Code
sections 273(a) and 181 would permit payment to the surrogate
but would also leave the state without adequate safeguards
against these socially condemned practices which reach far be-
yond cases of surrogate motherhood.'59
Although theoretically, the legislature could amend sections
273(a) and 181 to allow for payment to surrogate mothers, such
payment may not be in the best interests of the child or of surro-
gate motherhood in general. In spite of constitutional arguments,
judicial precedent, and the general contractual requirement of
consideration, such compensation, as shown below, may be
neither desirable nor necessary.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the right of a
woman to decide whether to have children as a fundamental per-
sonal right protected by the Constitution. 60 "If the right of pri-
vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as his decision
157. Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 611, 613 (1978); Brief
for Plaintiff at 15, Doe v. Kelley, No. 78-815531-CA (Cir. Ct. for the County of
Wayne, Mich. 1979).
158. Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L REV. 611, 613 (1978).
159. In contrast, modified in accordance with the suggestions presented above,
the presumptions of paternity and the artificial insemination statute would still
fulfill their original aims. If Evidence Code § 621 is eliminated, the purpose of the
conclusive presumption of paternity will still be accomplished, because the rebut-
table presumptions of paternity must be met with clear and convincing evidence.
CA. Crw. CODE § 7004(b) (West Supp. 1980). Giving interested parties standing to
rebut those presumptions in preliminary hearings at which blood test results and
contractual arrangments could be admitted as evidence will merely provide
judicial flexibility to deal with uncommon situations such as surrogate mother-
hood. It will not set off a rash of unwarranted paternity suits which might impugn
family integrity. Revising Civil Code § 7005(b) to permit semen donors' parental
rights in certain cases continues to uphold the statute's policy of protecting the
husband's rights in most cases, because only a written agreement between the do-
nor and the mother will allow the donor to claim paternity. In the case of the Pe-
nal Code's prohibitions against payment for the transfer of custody or adoption of
a child, however, the far-reaching policy considerations justify the retention of
those statutes.
160. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
whether to bear or beget a child."161 Denying surrogate mothers
the right to be paid for their contribution to another family argua-
bly deprives them of their right to bear a child for that purpose
and indirectly deprives adoptive mothers of their right to choose
this method of childbearing. 62 This argument, however, assumes
that prohibiting payment to a surrogate mother deprives her of
the right to be a surrogate mother. Penal Code sections 273(a)
and 181 do not prevent a woman from bearing a child for another
couple; they merely prevent her from being compensated. Wo-
men who cannot afford to be surrogate mothers without being
paid a fee are no more denied their fundamental rights than are
those who cannot afford abortions, contraceptives, or private
schooling for their children.163 The Constitution protects their
rights, not their financial ability to exercise those rights.164
Nor is the right of a couple to have a child through a surrogate
mother denied merely because the law prohibits their paying the
surrogate. Although at present there are more adoptive couples
seeking surrogate mothers than volunteer surrogates, the Consti-
tution does not guarantee that all infertile couples desiring surro-
gate motherhood will find willing surrogates any more than it
guarantees that all infertile couples desiring adoption will find
available children to adopt. The wife's infertility, not the state's
prohibition against payment to the surrogate, prevents the
couple's exercise of their right to bear and beget children.165
Although some precedent exists for permitting payment for the
transfer of custody between the child's natural parents, public
policy still frowns on financial gain as the motivating factor on the
part of the surrendering parent. In Reimche v. First National
Bank of Nevada, 166 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit permitted a mother to prove an alleged agreement
with the father of her illegitimate child whereby she had surren-
dered custody and consented to the father's adoption. The father,
in return, had promised to include both the mother and the child
in his will. He included the child but not the mother. The court
161. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453 (1972) (emphasis original).
162. Brief for Plaintiff at 20, Doe v. Kelley, No. 78-815531-CZ (Cir. Ct. for the
County of Wayne, Mich. 1979).
163. Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
164. "[I]t simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with
it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full
range of protected choices." Id. at 2688.
165. Brief for Defendant at 11, Doe v. Kelley, No. 78-815531-CZ (Cir. Ct. for the
County of Wayne, Mich. 1979); cf. Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980) (Woman's
indigency, rather than governmental restraints, restricts her ability to enjoy full
range of freedom of choice).
166. Reimche v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 512 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975).
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cited several decisions upholding similar agreements between
natural parents. In those cases the consideration for promises to
devise included the mother's forbearance from instituting filiation
proceedings,167 her consent to adoption,168 and her surrender of
the child.169 The court concluded that the agreement between
Reimche and her child's father was not against public policy. 70
The Reimche court limited its decision to the circumstances of
that case. There the agreement was between parents, the adop-
tion and the consideration were in the best interests of the child,
and pecuniary gain was not the mother's motivation.' 7 ' The Re-
statement (First) of Contracts likewise emphasizes the best inter-
ests of the child in determining whether a bargain by one parent
to transfer custody to the other is illegal.172 Reimche would not
apply to a case of surrogate motherhood. Although an agreement
by the donor to pay the surrogate for her release of parental
rights would be between the child's natural parents, the transfer
of custody would not be in the child's best interests, while pecuni-
ary gain might indeed be the motivating factor for the surrogate.
Reimche and the Restatement of Contracts both presuppose the
existence of a child whose best interests can be determined by
the particular circumstances at the time of the agreement. At the
time the donor agrees to pay the surrogate and she agrees to sur-
render her rights, the unborn child's interests, pecuniary or other-
wise, cannot always be determined. The controlling consideration
is not the welfare of the child but the desires of the adoptive
167. Schumm v. Berg, 37 Cal. 2d 174, 231 P.2d 39 (1951); Peterson v. Eritsland, 69
Wash. 2d 588, 419 P.2d 332 (1966).
168. Smith v. Wagers' Adm'rs, 238 Ky. 609, 38 S.W.2d 685 (1931); Redmon v. Rob-
erts, 198 N.C. 161, 150 S.E. 881 (1929).
169. Doty's Adm'rs v. Doty's Guardian, 118 Ky. 204, 80 S.W. 803 (1904); Couch v.
Couch, 35 Tenn. App. 464, 248 S.W.2d 327 (1951).
170. Reimche v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 512 F.2d at 189 (9th Cir. 1975).
171. Id.
172. (1) Except as stated in Subsection (2) a bargain by one entitled to
the custody of a minor child to transfer the custody to another person, or
not to reclaim custody already transferred of such a child, is illegal unless
authorized by statute.
(2) A bargain by one parent to transfer the custody of a minor child to
the other parent or not to reclaim such custody is not illegal if the per-
formance of the bargain is for the welfare of the child.
Comment: a. Like marriage, the custody of young children is of impor-
tance to the State. It is not a property right of the parents. The court may,
if it is for the welfare of the child, enforce the bargain, but will not do so
otherwise....
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CoNTRACTs § 583 (1932).
couple and the financial needs of the surrogate mother. If the sur-
rogate has already been reimbursed for her medical and living ex-
penses,173 her agreement to surrender her parental rights in
exchange for additional payment does indicate a pecuniary mo-
tiviation. Reimche was decided ad hoc; neither the dissent nor
the majority urged enforcement of all such agreements between
natural parents.174
If the donor is prohibited from paying the surrogate for her con-
sent to his custody of their child, another argument suggests,
their agreement lacks consideration and hence may be unenforce-
able.17 5 Thus the donor runs the risk of losing his child if the sur-
rogate changes her mind, because courts would not enforce an
agreement without consideration. One approach to this problem
recognizes that the surrogate does receive consideration. Consid-
eration is a bargained-for performance or promise, not merely a
measurable compensation or gain.176 The surrogate who volun-
teers in order to experience the emotional satisfaction of helping
an infertile couple has freely bargained for, and will receive, the
couple's performance (her insemination with the husband's se-
men) and the bargained-for emotional satisfaction.
Realistically, however, even though there is sufficient considera-
tion, the contract may not be enforced by the courts because of
remedial difficulties or considerations of public policy. A court of
equity will not specifically enforce a personal service contract;
the remedy not only borders on involuntary servitude but is also
impractical. If the services promised are not unique, an adequate
legal remedy exists. If the services are indeed unique, problems
of supervision and enforcement render an order of specific per-
formance ineffectual.177 Were the surrogate to decide to abort
during her pregnancy, no court would order her to continue the
pregnancy against her will, regardless of the existence of a con-
tract in which she agreed to bear the child to term in exchange for
consideration.178 Public policy might also prevent a court from
173. See note 187 infra.
174. The dissent cited several decisions refusing to enforce such agreements as
to the parents, regardless of the benefits thereby awarded to the child. Reimche v.
First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 512 F.2d at 196 (Koelsch, J., dissenting). See text accom-
panying notes 177-83 infra for further discussion of public policy arguments
against the enforceability of agreements to transfer custody.
175. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1972). See also Interview
of Katie Brophy, attorney for Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., on The Phil
Donahue Show, Donahue Transcript No. 04150 (Apr. 15, 1980) at 15.
176. RESTATEMENT (SEcONI) OF CONmRACTS §§ 75, 76 (1972).
177. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.5 (1973).
178. Id.; cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973) (the abortion decision must be
left to the woman's and her physician's judgment during the first trimester of
pregnancy). See also note 204 infra.
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enforcing a contract to transfer custody of a child.179 Children are
not chattels subject to barter,180 nor is a parent's right of control
or custody of a child a property right which may be bargained
away.3l8 Bargains to transfer custody of minor children are gen-
erally illegal.182 Even an agreement without consideration would
have significant evidentiary value as to the donor's paternity, but
consideration would not add to its enforceability in court, where
the best interests of the child and other policy objectives would
prevail.183
Neither the Constitution nor judicial precedent calls for permit-
ting payment to surrogate mothers, nor would such compensation
necessarily render an agreement enforceable. Furthermore, com-
pensation may not be required. Surrogates volunteer without of-
fers of compensation, 84 and, in Kentucky, even those who have
179. Kentucky Attorney General Steven L. Beshear has stated: "We have a
very strong public policy in Kentucky against baby buying, and one of the .very
strong concerns that we have is the monetary aspects [sic] of this practice." Cas-
tillo, When Women Bear Children for Others, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1980, § B, at 6,
col 2 (interview with Mr. Beshear). See also note 195 infra. The Attorney Gen-
eral of Michigan also believes that payment of a surrogate mother for more than
her maternity-related expenses would offend public policy as well as violate state
law. Brief for Defendant at 21, Doe v. Kelley, No. 78-815531-CZ (Cir. Ct. for the
County of Wayne, Mich. 1979). Gregory M. Luce, Assistant Attorney General of
Virginia, has suggested that, even if legal under state laws, payment to a surrogate
could be construed as a violation of the infant's civil rights under the thirteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution. Letter from Gregory M. Luce to at-
torney Jeff Krause of Arlington, Va. (Dec. 10, 1980) (on file with the author). In a
recent English case, a prostitute agreed to bear a child through AID for an unmar-
ried couple in exchange for £ 500. She refused to surrender the child. The court
held the agreement was for the sale and purchase of a child and hence void and
unenforceable. Cusine, "Womb-Leasing'" Some Legal Implications, 128 NEW L.J.
824 (1978).
180. 15 WILLSTON ON CoNTRACTs § 1744 (3d ed. 1972).
181. 67A CJ.S. Parent and Child § 16 (1978).
182. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) or CoNTRAcTs § 583 (1932).
183. Mr. Keane recognizes that the "statement of understanding" he prepares
is not an enforceable contract. Marcus, The Baby Maker, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 25, 1980,
at 1, col 1; White, Motherhood the "Surrogate" Way, SCL DIG., Mar. 1980, at 25. Ms.
Brophy acknowledges that even giving consideration in a surrogate contract,
which she believes is legally possible in Kentucky, would not ensure its enforce-
ability in court were the surrogate to attempt to keep the baby. A court decision
as to custody would be resolved in the best interests of the child, not merely by
the terms of the contract. Interview with Katie Brophy on The Phil Donahue
Show, Donahue Transcript No. 04150 (Apr. 15, 1980) at 2.
184. The motivating factor of a surrogate is the desire to extend to a woman bi-
ologically incapable of bearing children the opportunity to raise a child biologi-
cally related to her spouse. Brief for Plaintiff at 21, Doe v.'Kelley, No. 78-815531-CZ
(Cir. Ct. for the County of Wayne, Mich. 1979). See also note 191 infra.
been paid have not been motivated primarily by financial gain.185
Some surrogate mothers may be compensated sufficiently by ma-
ternity benefits from their own insurance.186 Those who are not
can be paid maternity-connected medical and hospital expenses
as well as "necessary living expenses" for the period preceding
and during confinement without violating Penal Code section
273(a), as long as the payments are not contingent upon the
child's adoption.187 Another possible method of compensating the
surrogate without violating the statutory prohibitions would limit
payment to a fee for her personal services, rather than as consid-
eration for her surrender of parental rights. Such payment would
not act as consideration for transfer of custody, but it would pay
the surrogate for her conceiving, bearing, and delivering a child
for the adoptive couple. Compensation for the surrogate's "neces-
sary living expenses" or for her personal services may be possible
even without altering Penal Code section 273(a) or 181.
Not only is a modification of those sections unnecessary; such a
revision would also create other, new problems. An adopting
stepparent is not required to report disbursements in connection
with the adoption.188 Without that information, the state would
have no control over the fee paid to the surrogate for her release
185. E.g., "Elizabeth Kane," Dr. Levin's surrogate in Louisville, "wanted to do it
for nothing" and accepted payment to appease her husband. One of Dr. Levin's
surrogate applicants, Janet Porter, has noted that she could work and earn as
much as she would be paid as a surrogate, but that "this is something I need and I
want to do." Interviews of Dr. Richard M. Levin and Janet Porter on The Phil Don-
ahue Show, Donahue Transcript No. 04150 (Apr. 15, 1980) at 5, 7.
186. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant at 3, Doe v. Kelley, No. 78-815531-CZ (Cir. Ct.
for the County of Wayne, Mich. 1979).
187. Since CAL. CIV. CODE § 224r (West Supp. 1980) (requiring a full accounting
of all disbursements in connection with the birth or adoption of the child), does
not apply to the adoption by a stepparent where one natural parent has retained
custody of the child, see note 31 supra, the donor and his wife will not be required
to account for their expenditures. No such exception exists in Michigan, where
the court must approve all charges and fees in connection with adoption place-
ments, releases, or consents. MiCH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 710.54 (West Supp. 1980).
Although a Michigan Juvenile Court Judge has stated that he would not permit
payment of lost wages under § 710.54, Brief for Plaintiff, Exhibit A at 1, Letter of
Judge James H. Lincoln to Margaret Pfeiffer, Doe v. Kelley, No. 78-815531-CZ (Cir.
Ct. for the County of Wayne, Mich. 1979), the "necessary living expenses" clause
of CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) seems to allow for flexibility. The $10,000 to be re-
ceived by a woman artificially inseminated as a surrogate for a single California
inan is for "medical expenses," not as a fee. Walz, Surrogate Mother Will Bear the
Baby of a Single Man, Daily Californian (El Cajon, Cal.), Oct. 15, 1980, § A, at 2,
coL 1.
188. CAL. Civ. CODE § 224r (West Supp. 1980). This section does provide for ju-
dicial review of the sums expended in a routine adoption. Dr. Levin has indicated
that he would match a surrogate who demanded $25,000 but that he might hesitate
if the figure were $100,000. Beyette, Having a Child by a Surrogate Parent, L.A.
Times, Aug. 22, 1980, § V, at 1, coL 1; Quindlen, Surrogate Mothers: A Controversial
Solution to Infertility, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1980, § B, at 12, coL 1.
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and consent to adoption. Permitting payment would be the prac-
tical equivalent of requiring payment, for once compensation is
available, few surrogates, even those truly motivated by altruism,
wouldreject it. The service then may be denied to those who can-
not afford the fee, or less-than-wealthy couples may settle for a
surrogate. who does not meet their physical or psychological stan-
dards' 89 but whose fee is reasonable.190
Amending sections 273(a) and 181 of the Penal Code to permit
payment to the surrogate could also cast judicial and social disfa-
vor upon surrogate motherhood itself. Presently, surrogates vol-
unteer for a variety of non-financial reasons.191 Where the
surrogates' aim is altruistic rather than pecuniary, both society
and the courts favor their participation. Legislation providing for
their compensation, however, mdy encourage a host of women
whose motivation is the compensation itself.192 What now may be
viewed as an alternative method of family planning for infertile
couples might be seen instead as the hiring of a woman's repro-
ductive system.193 Courts that approve of agreements between
natural parents in which financial gain is not the motivating factor
189. The couple matched with "Elizabeth Kane," for example, sought a tall sur-
rogate of above average intelligence. Interview with Dr. Levin on The Phil Dona-
hue Show, Donahue Transcript No. 04150 (Apr. 15, 1980), at 4. See also PEOPLE,
Apr. 21, 1980, at 38. This type of matching is common in traditional adoptions.
190. This raises the question of state regulation of payments. If the state does
not prescribe permissible fees, fluctuating prices may create a baby market, but
the state might have to demonstrate a compelling interest in regulating payment
to justify fee setting at all.
191. Most simply "want to help," Beyette, Having a Child by a Surrogate Par-
ent, L. Times, Aug. 22, 1980, § V, at 1, coL 1; White, Motherhood the "Surrogate"
Way, SC. DIG., Mar. 1980, at 25 (help "another couple's dream to come true").
Some women like to be pregnant. White, Motherhood the "Surrogate" Way, SCL
DIG., Mar. 1980, at 25. Others "want people who can't have children to know that it
can be done." MAcLEAN's, Mar. 10, 1980, at 10. One potential surrogate has de-
clared, "It's my need to give. I also have a child and ... I can understand some-
one who could not have the joy that I have. I would like to give that much."
Interview with Janet Porter on The Phil Donahue Show, Donahue Transcript No.
04150 (Apr. 15, 1980) at 5.
192. This does not imply that permitting payment will reduce all volunteer sur-
rogates to greedy opportunists. Many women will still seek to be surrogates for
altruistic reasons. Yet the availability of compensation could also attract a new
breed of surrogates whose desire is primarily financial.
193. Arguably, a woman has a right to choose the means by which she will earn
her living, even if that means involves the use of her sexual capacities. Just as the
state denies her that right when she wishes to be employed as a prostitute, how-
ever, CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(b) (West Supp. 1980), it may also deny her that right
when she wishes to earn her living as a surrogate mother.
would frown on those based primarily on compensation. 9 4 In-
deed, such transactions come dangerously close to the baby-sell-
ing proscribed by the Penal Code. Although the object of those
statutes is to prevent a natural mother from being influenced
financially to give up her child irrespective of the child's best in-
terests, they also ensure that a potential mother will not create a
child primarily out of financial greed or need. If children are not
chattels to be bargained away, neither are they products to be
manufactured for gain.
A final consideration against amending the Penal Code sections
is the fact that almost all jurisdictions prohibit payment for adop-
tion and for the transfer of custody of a child. Even in Kentucky,
where donors have paid surrogates for the relinquishment of pa-
rental rights, the legality of such payment is questionable. 9 5 To
the extent that California takes guidance from its sister states,
the legislature should think hard before altering these traditional
prohibitions. Compensation beyond reasonable expenses is man-
dated by neither the Constitution nor judicial precedent. It will
not make a contract with the surrogate enforceable. Surrogates
volunteer even without payment, and those who require reim-
bursement may be paid at least necessary medical and living ex-
penses, and perhaps an additional fee for their services.
Statutorily permitting payment for surrogate motherhood would
create new problems, including the possible development of a
market in surrogates and their babies. The legislature should not
except compensation for surrogate mothers from the sanctions of
the Penal Code.
194. See Reimche v. First Natl Bank of Nev., 512 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975). See
text accompanying notes 166-74 supra.
195. Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.590(2) (1975) provides that no person, agency, or insti-
tution not licensed by the department of human resources may charge a fee for
the procurement of a child for adoption purposes. Surrogate Parenting Associates,
Inc., interprets this law as permitting payment for an agreement to terminate pa-
rental rights. To avoid violating the statute, the donor, not his wife, contracts with
and pays the surrogate. Only after the donor has made the payment and gained
custody of the child does the donor's wife adopt the child. Technically, the money
has been exchanged, not for the purpose of adoption, but for the relinquishment of
parental rights and the transfer of custody. Nevertheless, the Kentucky Attorney
General has issued an advisory opinion that such paid surrogate motherhood ar-
rangements violate both the Kentucky statute and the state's public policy against
the buying and selling of children, and has filed suit against Surrogate Parenting
Associates. Kentucky v. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc., No. 81-CI-0121 (Frank-
lin Cir. Ct., fied Jan. 27,1981); Castillo, Kentucky Attorney General Calls Surrogate
Motherhood Illegal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1981, § C, at 9, coL 1 (interview with Attor-
ney General Steven L. Beshear). See note 19 supra. The Kentucky legislature is
also aware of the publicity attached to surrogate motherhood as practiced in the
state and may introduce specific proposals in its regular session beginning in Jan-
uary 1982. Letter from Edith Schwab, Reviser of Statutes, Kentucky Legislative
Research Commission, to the author (Sept. 24, 1980) (on fie with the author).
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THE EXTENT OF LEGISLATION
The above proposals suggest a minimum of legislative change.
Many aspects of surrogate motherhood are better left to private
agreement than enacted in specific legislation. Regulation or a
specific enabling act could neither forsee new developments nor
solve all the problems presently connected with surrogate moth-
erhood.196 For these reasons, California's legislation should be al-
tered as little as possible to permit rather than to provide
specifically for surrogate motherhood.
Surrogate motherhood arrangements have been effected
through a variety of agreements ranging from a non-binding mem-
orandum between the parties197 to a detailed contract specifying
each party's obligations.198 The fact that a state forbids compen-
196. See Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 611, 621-22
(1978) (discussing proposed regulation).
197. This is the procedure Mr. Keane has followed in Michigan. MAcLEAN's,
Mar. 10, 1980, at 10.
198. Under the contract drafted in 1980 by Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc.,
of Louisville, Ky., the natural father (the donor) agrees: to pay the surrogate a
specified consideration, which shall be deposited with the donor's attorney and
paid to the surrogate upon completion of her obligations; to pay the surrogate's
medical expenses which are not covered by her own insurance, excluding ex-
penses for emotional problems related to the pregnancy and expenses occurring
six weeks after birth; to pay for paternity testing and the surrogate's travel ex-
penses; to undergo paternity testing; to purchase a term life insurance policy on
the surrogate's life in a specified amount to remain in effect until six weeks after
birth, payable to a named beneficiary; to provide in his will for support of the child
should he die prior to the birth; to purchase a term life insurance policy on his life
payable in trust to the unborn child; to pay for psychiatric and psychological test-
ing of the surrogate and her husband; to accept all children born in a multiple
birth; to compensate the surrogate at a reduced rate in the event of a miscarriage;
to undergo a physical and genetic evaluation; not to seek the identity of the surro-
gate or her husband or to advise the child of their identity if known; to assume
legal responsibility for an abnormal child.
The surrogate agrees to terminate all parental rights to the child, to undergo a
physical and genetic evaluation and blood tests, and not to abort unless the insem-
inating physician determines it is necessary for her health or that the child is ab-
normal, in which case the surrogate agrees to have the abortion. Her husband
agrees not to form a parent-child relationship but to do all necessary to rebut the
presumption of his paternity. The surrogate and her husband further agree: to in-
stitute proceedings to terminate parental rights and permit the adoption of the
child, to return all sums paid in the event the natural father is excluded by blood
tests; to assume all risks, including that of death, incident to the pregnancy and
delivery; to undergo psychological and psychiatric evaluations; to reimburse the
natural father in the event custody is awarded to anyone other than the natural
father to reimburse the natural father or Dr. Levin for all monies expended if the
surrogate or her husband violates any of the provisions of the agreement; to pro-
vide no interview without the consent of the adoptive parents' attorney; not to
sation beyond ordinary medical expenses should not preclude the
drafting of a detailed agreement.199 Most of the terms should be
left to the free negotiation of the parties, rather than to the legis-
lature, if only to add to the chances of the contract's enforceabil-
ity.200 Adoptive couples and surrogates will want to tailor their
agreements to their own circumstances. One surrogate may al-
ready be adequately insured; another may wish to reveal her
identity to the donor and his wife.201 Most surrogates will agree
to artificial insemination by a physician, yet others have re-
quested that the donor's wife perform the insemination so that
she can play an active role in the procedure. 202 Physical and psy-
chological testing can be bargained for freely between the par-
ties.20 3 Farsighted participants may wish to include even more
specific terms in their agreements. Who shall take custody of the
child if the adoptive couple separates or one of the couple dies
before birth? Is the surrogate required to undergo amniocentesis?
If testing during pregnancy reveals a deformed fetus, may the sur-.
rogate abort? Alternatively, can the adoptive couple require her
to abort?204 In either case, or in case of a natural miscarriage, is
seek to view the child or to meet with the natural father; to place the child in Dr.
Levin's custody for adoption, in the event the natural father predeceases the
child's birth; not to smoke, drink alcohol, or use illegal drugs, or medications with-
out Dr. Levin's consent; to follow a specified pre-natal examination schedule. All
parties agree to terminate the agreement if pregnancy has not occurred within a
reasonable time and not to provide any information which could help identify the
parties or the child. Kentucky v. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc., No. 81-CI-0121,
Exhibit C (Franklin Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 27, 1981).
199. Consideration will not necessarily make the contract enforceable. See text
accompanying notes 177-83 supra.
200. If it appears that the surrogate agreed to undergo a particular procedure
only because it was required by state legislation, the court might conclude that
she did not enter freely into that part of the barkain.
201. Both parties may even wish to continue contact after the birth of the child.
See Walz, Surrogate Mother Will Bear the Baby of a Single Man, Daily Californian
(El Cajon, CaL), Oct. 15, 1980, § A, at 2, coL 1. This is likely when sisters serve as
surrogates for infertile siblings as occurred in Tennessee, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11,
1980, § A, at 25, col 1, and in California, Daly Californian (El Cajon, Cal.), Jan. 16,
1981, § A, at 6, col. 1.
202. White, Motherhood the "Surrogate" Way, SCL DIG., Mar. 1980, at 25. The
agreement could still require that the insemination be performed under a physi-
cian's supervision.
203. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., requires such testing. Interview with
Dr. Richard M. Levin on The Phil Donahue Show, Donahue Transcript No. 04150
(Apr. 15, 1980) at 4.
204. The contract drafted by Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., specifies that
the decision to abort is left to the physician, who will order an abortion only if the
mother's health is endangered or the child will be abnormal. Marcus, The Baby
Maker, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 1. Mr. Handel's contract, used in Califor-
nia, provides that only the donor or the surrogate may decide to abort. Telephone
interview with William Handel (Dec. 30, 1980).
The donor may be unable to prevent the surrogate from having an abortion. In
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that the
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the surrogate obligated to be re-inseminated? Is the surrogate
subject to liability for her alleged negligence in causing a miscar-
riage? Is the adoptive couple subject to liability for the death of
the surrogate resulting from pregnancy or childbirth?205 If the
surrogate dies in childbirth and the child survives her, can the
child inherit from the surrogate? These questions reflect the vari-
ety of issues to be resolved in each case. An agreement between
the surrogate and the adoptive couple, rather than specific legisla-
tion, should set out the obligations of each party.
Another issue that specific surrogate motherhood legislation
would find difficult to resolve is whether the practice should be
available to everyone. Presently most surrogate motherhood
agreements involve married, infertile couples. Would the law per-
mit single, infertile women to use surrogates? 2 06 Single men?207
"Women" who were formerly men but who have undergone sex
change operations? 208 Should the practice be restricted to infer-
tile women, or should those who could bear their own children
but do not choose to do so also be able to have a child through a
surrogate mother? Is their reason for preferring surrogate moth-
erhood relevant? Would the state allow women over thirty-five to
use surrogates because their natural children would face an in-
creased danger of birth defects, but deny surrogate motherhood
to the belly dancer whose career cannot tolerate stretch marks?209
woman and her physician may decide to terminate a pregnancy in the first trimes-
ter. In Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Court held
that a woman may have an abortion without her husband's consent. Since a hus-
band's consent is not constitutionally mandated, neither would the donor's con-
sent be required.
205. The insurance policy stipulated in the Surrogate Parenting Associates,
Inc., contract in effect provides for this possibility.
206. Arguably, the state cannot restrict the use of surrogates to married wo-
men. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (regulating the distribution of contra-
ceptives on the basis of marital status violates the equal protection clause).
207. Mr. Keane has matched a surrogate with a single California man. Walz,
Surrogate Mother Will Bear the Baby of a Single Man, Daily Californian (El Ca-
jon, Cal.), Oct. 15, 1980, § A, at 2, col 1.
208. Mr. Keane is arranging for a surrogate for such an individual and her hus-
band. Marcus, The Baby Maker, Nat'l L.T., Aug. 25, 1980, at 1, col 1. The infertile
sister in the Tennessee case reported in December 1980 was formerly a man. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 11, 1980, § A, at 25, coL 1; see note 201 supra.
209. Dr. Levin has noted the difficulties of determining, even on a private scale,
who shall have the right to bear a child through the use of a surrogate.
A certain amount of information, anonymously, is given to the surrogate
mother, and she has the right to say, "Wait. I don't like these people.
They don't sound like the kind of people that I would want to have the
child that rm going to deliver." But morally, I don't have the right to say
The legislature is in no better position than the individual physi-
cian or attorney to determine who should be permitted to take ad-
vantage of this method of childbearing. Furthermore, surrogate
motherhood may be only the first in a series of new alternatives
to traditional childbearing.2 10 To legislate specifically for surro-
gate motherhood as it is presently practiced would be only a stop-
gap measure.
The legislature need not pass an entirely new statute authoriz-
ing surrogate motherhood, but should make the following statu-
tory modifications:
1. Repeal Evidence Code section 621.
2. Amend Civil Code section 7006(b) to read: "Any interested
party may bring an action at any time for the purpose of deter-
mining the existence or nonexistence of the father and child rela-
tionship."
3. Add to Evidence Code section 895: "If the experts concludet
that the blood test and tissue typing results show the possibility
of the alleged father's paternity, admission of this evidence is
within the discretion of the court."
4. Enact, as new section 7009 of the Civil Code, sections 10
through 13 of the draft Uniform Parentage Act.
5. Add new Civil Code subsection 7004(a) (5) to read: "He ac-
knowledges his paternity of the child in a writing filed with the
State Department of Social Services or an appropriate court,
which shall promptly inform the mother of the filing of the ac-
knowledgment, and she does not dispute the acknowledgment
within a reasonable time after being informed thereof, in a writing
fied with the State Department of Social Services or the court. If
another man is presumed under this section to be the child's fa-
ther, acknowledgment may be effected only with the written con-
sent of the presumed father or after the presumption has been
rebutted."
to couples coming into my office, "Yes, you can have a baby. And you can-
not have a baby.' This was tried in the Forties in Europe, and, you know,
I don't have that moral capacity.
Interview with Dr. Richard M. Levin on The Phil Donahue Show, Donhue Tran-
script No. 04150 (Apr. 15, 1980) at 14-15. On another occasion Dr. Levin has indi-
cated that he would not participate in the case of the belly dancer but that he is
not sure about the case of the older woman. Beyette, Having a Child by a Surro-
gate Parent, L.A Times, Aug. 22, 1980, § V, at 1, coL 1.
210. Physicians in England using in vitro fertilization have reimplanted the fer-
tilized egg in the uterus of the woman who produced the egg. The .egg could also
be implanted in the uterus of a surrogate mother. See generally Oaldey, Test Tube
Babies: Proposals for Legal Regulation of New Methods of Human Conception and
Prenatal Development, 8 FA,. L.Q. 385 (1974). It is not clear which woman would
be considered the "natural" mother of a child so conceived.
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6. Amend Civil Code subsection 7005(b) to read: "The donor
of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial in-
semination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in
law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby con-
ceived, unless the donor and the woman agree that said donor
shall be the father. The agreement must be in writing and signed
by the donor and the woman. The physician shall certify their
signatures and the date of the insemination and shall retain the
written agreement as part of the medical record, where it shall be
kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the physician's
failure to do so does not affect the father and child relationship.
Such written agreement between the donor and the woman may
be admitted as evidence in a preliminary or full judicial hearing."
CONCLUSION
Although a number of legal obstacles presently discourage sur-
rogate motherhood in California by hampering the semen donor's
efforts to establish his paternity, minor legislative modifications
would enable infertile couples to have children through the use of
a surrogate. The repeal of Evidence Code section 621 would re-
move a major barrier to the donor's claim to paternity, while its
policy objectives would be met by the rebuttable presumptions of
Civil Code section 7004(a). The donor should be given standing to
rebut those presumptions and the opportunity to introduce appro-
priate evidence to do so. Under a new section of the Uniform Par-
entage Act he could acknowledge his paternity before or after the
child's birth. Under an amendment to the artificial insemination
statute his written agreement with the surrogate would manifest
their intent that in this case the semen donor be treated as the
legal and natural father of the child. Modifying Penal Code sec-
tions 273(a) and 181 is neither necessary nor desirable. Because
the current practice of surrogate motherhood suggests new, as yet
unanswered questions, the legislature should leave the details of
each transaction to the parties involved. The proposed amend-
ments are sufficient to permit surrogate motherhood as a legal
childbearing option.
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